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Abstract
When private information is observed by ambiguity averse investors, asset prices
may be informationally ineﬃcient in rational expectations equilibrium. This ineﬃ-
ciency implies lower asset prices as uninformed investors require a premium to hold
assets and higher return volatility relative to informationally eﬃcient benchmarks.
Moreover, asset returns are negatively skewed and may be leptokurtic. Ineﬃciency
also leads to ampliﬁcation in price of small changes in news, relative to informationally
eﬃcient benchmarks. Public information aﬀects the nature of unrevealed private infor-
mation and the informational ineﬃciency of prices. Asset prices may be lower (higher)
with good (bad) public information.
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1 Introduction
Along with their role in rationing assets, market prices aggregate and convey information. In
many asset pricing models prices always react to and reveal information.1 However, growing
empirical research indicates that prices react to news in diﬀering ways depending on the
state of the economy, which may aﬀect information transmission.2 This paper investigates
the ability of market prices to transmit private information when it is observed by ambiguity
averse investors and shows that the reaction of market prices to news can be very diﬀerent
than in traditional asset market models.
When ambiguity averse investors observe ambiguous private information in an otherwise
frictionless market, a range of this information will not be revealed by asset prices in REE
(rational expectations equilibrium) in the framework we study. This is in contrast to the
case of private information observed by ambiguity-neutral investors.
This informational ineﬃciency of prices leads to several interesting phenomena. First,
asset prices incorporate a premium due to the unrevealed information and are thus lower than
they would otherwise be. This premium increases with fundamental risk and return volatility
is higher relative to informationally eﬃcient benchmarks, where there is no asymmetry of
information or there is no ambiguity in information. Asset returns exhibit negative skewness
and may also exhibit excess kurtosis. Moreover, informational ineﬃciency can amplify price
reaction to small changes in news and implies price volatility changes with informational
eﬃciency of price. Finally, public information aﬀects the nature of the unrevealed information
and the informational eﬃciency of prices. This leads to the seemingly anomalous result
that an asset’s price is lower (respectively, higher) when public information conveys good
(respectively, bad) news.
These results stem from two facts. The ﬁrst is that ambiguity averse informed traders
who receive ambiguous private information about an asset will trade oﬀ their asset holdings
unless they are compensated by an ambiguity premium. Moreover, they will do so at the
same price for a range of information, a property we term portfolio inertia in information.
Uninformed traders who take positive positions in the asset will then require a market risk
premium which compensates them for fundamental risk and for the reduction in asset holders
in addition to a premium for the unrevealed information. Non-revelation of information in
REE arises when the premium required by the uninformed traders due to the reduction in
1For instance, Grossman (1981), Radner (1979) inter alia.
2See for example, Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega (2007), Faust, Rogers, Wang, and Wright
(2007), and others.
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asset holders is lower in aggregate than the ambiguity premium required by informed traders.
In the informationally ineﬃcient REE, the unrevealed information premium is higher for
riskier assets and the informational ineﬃciency in price leads to returns that are negatively
skewed and, for some parameter values, leptokurtic.
The second fact is that the price of an asset changes discontinuously relative to news as
the informational eﬃciency of price changes. The non-revelation of some information implies
that uninformed traders’ beliefs are based on a set of possible signal values as opposed to
being based on exact information. This implies that beliefs will diﬀer discontinuously. Since
these uninformed traders’ beliefs drive asset prices in equilibrium, prices are discontinuous
relative to news. This discontinuity implies price ampliﬁcation of news changes. Since public
information aﬀects the range of unrevealed information, it aﬀects the beliefs of informed and
uninformed investors. This may lead to asset prices being lower despite good public news
because public information aﬀects what private information is revealed.
To establish the above results, we extend the standard CARA-normal REE model where
market prices aggregate and communicate information (see Grossman (1976) or Radner
(1979) among others). In the main model that we analyze ambiguity averse informed traders
receive ambiguous private information. That is, their beliefs are represented by a set of
probability distributions over the underlying fundamentals rather than a single distribution.
These traders are ambiguity averse in the sense of the Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) multiple
priors (MEU) representation.3 Uninformed traders can be ambiguity-neutral or averse.
The key property of portfolio inertia in information is a consequence of the non-smooth
MEU representation. It is distinct from the portfolio inertia in prices property identiﬁed
by Dow and da Costa Werlang (1992b), but related since both follow from non-smoothness
of the representation. Incorporating this non-smooth decision-making model has provided
a number of insights in studying ﬁnancial markets (Epstein and Schneider 2010).4 Smooth
preference representations such as Klibanoﬀ, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005), Maccheroni,
Marinacci, and Rustichini (2006), and Hansen and Sargent (2007) do not yield inertia in
information and so will not generate the informational ineﬃciency we study here. Experi-
3This representation captures the degree of conﬁdence decision-makers have in probabilistic assessments
based on the quality of information, unlike the Savage (1954) decision-making model (Gilboa and Marinacci
(2012)). See also Ellsberg (1961), Keynes (1921) and Knight (1921).
4Much of these are developed with representative investor or homogeneous information frameworks. Un-
like in a representative investor framework, equilibrium asset prices under partial revelation here are not
driven by the worst-case assessment of ambiguity averse investors. Moreover, Chapman and Polkovnichenko
(2009) show that ignoring underlying heterogeneity can signiﬁcantly change estimates for the equity premium
and risk free rate.
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mental evidence in Ahn, Choi, Kariv, and Gale (2011), Asparouhova, Bossaerts, Eguia, and
Zame (2012), and Bossaerts, Ghirardato, Guarneschelli, and Zame (2010) provides persua-
sive support of non-smooth models of ambiguity aversion in ﬁnancial markets.
Information non-revelation under ambiguity diﬀers from informational ineﬃciency due to
noise-, endowment-, or taste-shock mechanisms. These models introduce additional exoge-
nous randomness in price to impede information revelation.5 Our analysis suggests that the
ambiguity-based and noise-based mechanisms provide diﬀering, but complementary means
of studying ﬁnancial markets.
This paper ﬁts into a growing literature studying informational eﬃciency and ambiguity
averse traders including Tallon (1998), Caskey (2008), Ozsoylev and Werner (2011), and
Mele and Sangiorgi (2015). Each of these papers use the noise trader mechanism for infor-
mational ineﬃciency. On the other hand, Condie and Ganguli (2011a), Easley, O’Hara, and
Yang (2011), and Yu (2014) do not include noise traders in their market model.6 Condie
and Ganguli (2011a) demonstrates that the informational ineﬃciency studied here has the
desirable property of being robust in the context of general ﬁnancial market economies with
ﬁnitely many states and signal values, similar to those studied in Radner (1979).
The paper proceeds as follows. We ﬁrst develop the ﬁnancial market model in Section 2.
Section 3 describes the conditions for and nature of non revelation of information. Section
4 elaborates the pricing implications of partial revelation and Section 5 examines the eﬀects
of public information. Section 6 discusses the model in the context of noise-based partial
revelation, other sources of inertia in information, and strategic trading behavior. Section
7 concludes. All proofs for the results in the main text are in Appendix A. Supplementary
appendix B contains extensions of the baseline model and shows that similar qualitative
results hold. These extensions include (i) non-tradable labour income as a source of ambigu-
ous information, (ii) ambiguity-averse uninformed traders, (iii) all traders observing private
information, and (iv) ambiguity averse informed investors with ambiguous priors who receive
unambiguous private information.
5See Dow and Gorton (2008) for a recent discussion of these.
6de Castro, Pesce, and Yannelis (2010) introduce and prove existence, incentive compatibility, and Pareto
eﬃciency of a separate equilibrium concept they call ‘maximin rational expectations equilibrium’.
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2 A model of ambiguous private information
The model is populated by two types of investors, denoted by n ∈ {I, U}. I-investors
receive a private signal and are referred to as informed investors whereas U-investors don’t
receive any private information and are referred to as uninformed. The mass of I-investors
is 0 < xI0 < 1 and that of U-investors is 0 < x
U
0 < 1, with x
I
0 + x
U
0 = 1. All investors live for
3 periods and trade assets in the market. Time is indexed by t = 0, 1, 2. Investors observe
information and trade at t = 1. All uncertainty is resolved and consumption occurs at t = 2.
Two assets are traded in the market. The ﬁrst asset is a risk-free bond whose payoﬀ is
denoted vf = 1.
7 This asset is in perfectly elastic supply and we normalize its gross rate of
return to one. The second asset, called the stock, has an uncertain terminal value denoted
by v. It is assumed to be in unit net supply. At time 0, type n-investors are endowed in
aggregate with xn0 > 0 of the uncertain asset and 0 units of the bond. Trade occurs in period
1 with the resolution of uncertainty occurring in period 2.
We assume that the stock payoﬀ v is normally distributed with mean μ0 and precision
ρ0. In period 0, all investors have identical information about the stock. However, the two
types of traders diﬀer in their receipt and perception of information in period 1. At t = 1,
I-investors receive a private signal
s = v +  (1)
that conveys information about v, where  is a stochastic error term. The signal is interpreted
diﬀerently by the informed I-investors and the uninformed U-investors, if the latter observe
it. This diﬀerential interpretation is related to the signal error term .
Both types of investors agree that the signal error  is distributed normally with precision
ρ but have diﬀering assessments of the mean μ of the error term. I-investors believe the
information may be biased but are unsure about the direction of this bias. I-investors’ lack of
knowledge about the signal bias is modeled as ambiguity in the signal in the sense that they
know only that μ ∈ [−δ, δ] where δ > 0. The size of this interval captures the I-investors
degree of conﬁdence in the information. Moreover, I-investors are averse to this perceived
ambiguity. In this structure, I-investors use a set of likelihoods, indexed by μI ∈ [−δ, δ], in
updating their beliefs, which we discuss formally in section 2.1.8
I-investors may doubt the unbiasedness of a signal because of concerns about the signal
7It would perhaps be more appropriate to use the term ‘uncertainty-free’ to describe this asset in our
setting, but we stay with the usual terminology.
8Yu (2014) considers a related information structure with multiple likelihoods but where signals are drawn
from a ﬁnite set and their relation to the underlying fundamental is not explicitly modeled.
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source, because the information is intangible in the sense of Daniel and Titman (2006),
or because the relationship between the signal and the stock is ambiguous, for example,
receiving ambiguous private information about a non-traded asset like labor income, whose
payoﬀ is correlated with that of the stock (see Section B.1), among other possibilities. See
also the discussions in Epstein and Schneider (2008) and Illeditsch (2011).9
On the other hand, U-investors do not perceive ambiguity in the signal and believe it
is unbiased, i.e. their assessment of the mean μU = 0. This assumption is for tractability
and is relaxed in Section B.3 to allow U investors to be ambiguity averse at the cost of
some notational simplicity, but without much additional insight into the nature of partial
revelation. The key requirement is that U investors perceive less ambiguity in the signal,
when they observe it through price, than I investors. We show in Section B.4 that similar
results on partial revelation also hold in an alternative setting where I investors have prior
beliefs represented by a set of distributions and consider the signal is unambiguous in the
sense that they consider that μ = 0 like U investors.
10
These structures imply that the informational ineﬃciency found in this paper derives
from the ambiguity-aversion of the private information recipients and not of the uninformed
investors. That is, it is not the uninformed investors’ inability to interpret information which
drives informational ineﬃciency. We do not claim that such heterogeneity in ambiguity
aversion or perception of ambiguity in information are pervasive. However, we think it is
reasonable that such diﬀerences exist, especially since our results demonstrate that partial
revelation can arise when a small fraction of investors perceive their own information to be
ambiguous.11 In this respect, our results illustrate how ambiguity can aﬀect market eﬃciency
and market aggregates even if it is not embodied by a large presence in the market, unlike
for example, models with a representative ambiguity averse investor.
This model can be extended to allow for U investors to receive private signals as well, as
9These papers model ambiguity through an interval of signal variances. We do not explore this additional
interesting avenue for ambiguity in information here.
10U investors, or some subset of U investors, may be considered as competitive risk-averse market makers,
along the lines discussed for example in Vives (2008) (Chapters 4 and 8).
11One way to think about why U investors may consider the information to be unambiguous or less
ambiguous than I investors is along the lines of the discussion in Gilboa, Postlewaite, and Schmeidler (2012)
and Gilboa and Marinacci (2012), which point out that the Savage (1954) SEU representation does not allow
a lack of ignorance or conﬁdence to be captured. In this very speciﬁc sense, I and U investors in the baseline
model could be considered to be representing investors who have diﬀerential attitudes toward ignorance. I
investors are sensitive (averse) to this, while U investors are not. We do not consider this to be the same
phenomena as the notion of overconﬁdence developed in, for example Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam
(1998), although we note that there is no contradiction between the two ideas. For example, the true signal
bias could be below any ﬁxed bias that U investors believe is present in the information.
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we show in Section B.2. If these are unambiguous or if U investors are ambiguity-neutral,
then such signals will be revealed in equilibrium and the qualitative results on non-revelation
of ambiguous private information would hold similarly.12
2.1 Decision making
Investors’ von Neumann-Morgenstern utility u is in the constant absolute risk aversion
(CARA) class with common CARA coeﬃcient γ, i.e.
u(w) = − exp (−γw) , (2)
where terminal wealth w(θ) = θv + m with stockholding θ and bondholding m. Since
initial wealth of each trader is w0 = p, the period 0 budget constraint p = θp +m implies
w = p+ θ(v − p).
Ambiguous information is processed and incorporated using the updating rule developed
in Epstein and Schneider (2007) and Epstein and Schneider (2008). This rule reduces to
Bayes’ rule when the information is unambiguous. The following result characterizes these
updated beliefs for I-investors.13
Lemma 1. The updated beliefs of an I-investor about v after observing signal s are repre-
sented by the set of normal distributions with precision ρI |s = ρ0 + ρ and means
[μI |s, μI |s] =
[
ρ0μ0 + ρ(s− δ)
ρ0 + ρ
,
ρ0μ0 + ρ(s+ δ)
ρ0 + ρ
]
. (3)
The updated beliefs of U-investors depend on their inference of information from price
and will be derived as part of the equilibrium below.
Ambiguity averse investors make decisions using the multiple prior max-min expected
utility (MEU) criterion, which was axiomatized by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989).14 Denoting
by F n the set of distributions representing n investor beliefs given information as in Lemma
12If both I and U investors observe private information which they perceive to be ambiguous, then the
analysis we carry out in Section B.2 and Section B.3 is suggestive that if information is considered more
ambiguous by those who observe than those who do not, it may not be revealed through price.
13Investors make decisions only once after receiving information, so issues of dynamic inconsistency do not
arise, but inter-temporal decision making would be dynamically consistent with this updating rule and our
assumptions.
14The ambiguity aversion of investors in this representation can be formalized using the analysis of Gajdos,
Hayashi, Tallon, and Vergnaud (2008).
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1, the utility from a portfolio with stock demand θ is
Un(θ) = min
F∈Fn
EF [u(w(θ))] = min
F∈Fn
EF (− exp (−γw(θ))) , (4)
This includes the case of Savage (1954) expected utility U-investors who do not perceive
any ambiguity when FU is a single probability distribution.
Utility UI is everywhere diﬀerentiable except when the terminal wealth from portfolio
holdings is not uncertain, i.e. when the investor trades away his holdings of the stock and
holds only the risk-free asset. This non-diﬀerentiability is key for the partial revelation
equilibria.15
2.2 Market prices and rational expectations equilibria
Trade in the assets occurs in period 1. A price function p maps signal values s to asset prices,
i.e. p(s) = (p(s), pf (s)), where p denotes the stock price and pf the bond price. Since we
have normalized the price of the bond to 1, we study the price function p(s) = (p(s), 1) and
abusing notation use p(s) to denote the function hereafter. Information is revealed through
prices when the function p(s) is invertible. When this occurs for all signals, U-investors
correctly infer each signal by observing the market price and the price function is said to be
fully-revealing.
When the function is not invertible, the market prices will not reveal all information and
the function is said to be partially revealing. When prices are partially revealing, multiple
signal values may be consistent with the observed market price p¯ and U-investors know only
that some signal from the set p−1(p¯) was observed by I-investors.
The market clearing condition for the stock is
xI0θ
I + xU0 θ
U = 1 (5)
The rational expectations equilibrium (REE) concept requires that individuals behave
optimally given the information that they have and that they make use of all available
information.
15Though we will not explore this further, other portfolio positions where utility is non-diﬀerentiable could
be used for studying the kind of partial revelation we present here. For example, Epstein and Schneider
(2010) (section 3.1.2 ) suggest a formulation which may yield non-diﬀerentiability at a non-zero portfolio
position.
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Deﬁnition 1. A rational expectations equilibrium is a set of portfolios {θI(s), θU(s)}s and a
price function p(·), which speciﬁes stock price p(s) for each signal s, such that the following
hold almost surely.
1. Each I-investor has information s and chooses a stock demand θI(s) measurable with
respect to s, that satisﬁes
θI(s) ∈ argmaxUI(θ|s) (6)
subject to the trader’s budget constraint.
2. Each U-investor has information p−1(p¯) at stock price p¯ and chooses a stock demand
θU(s) measurable with respect to p, subject to the budget constraint, that satisﬁes
θU(s) ∈ argmaxUU(θ|p−1(·)) (7)
3. The market clearing condition (5) holds.
Given this deﬁnition, an REE is said to be fully revealing when the equilibrium price
function is fully revealing and it is said to be partially revealing otherwise. In the above
deﬁnition, we specify I-investors’ information as the private signal s since the price does not
convey any additional information to them.
2.3 Informed investor demand and inertia
I-investor demand is given in the following result, which also characterizes the ambiguity
premium required by these investors to hold a non-zero position in the stock.
Proposition 1. Suppose the stock price is p. The optimal portfolio of I-investors who
observes signal s is given by
θI(s, p) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
γ−1ρI |s (μI |s− p) s > (μ0 + δ)− ρ0+ρρ (μ0 − p)
0 (μ0 − δ)− ρ0+ρρ (μ0 − p) ≤ s ≤ (μ0 + δ)−
ρ0+ρ
ρ
(μ0 − p)
γ−1ρI |s (μI |s− p) s < (μ0 − δ)− ρ0+ρρ (μ0 − p)
(8)
I-investors require an ambiguity premium of δρ to be long or short in the stock.
I-investors require an ambiguity premium whenever they do not trade away their stock
holding to a zero position. This premium is in addition to the usual risk premium required
9
by risk-averse investors. I-investors require a reduction (respectively, an increase) of δρ in
the stock price when they are long (respectively, short) in the stock given their eﬀective belief
μI |s (respectively, μI |s). Whenever the price does not incorporate this ambiguity premium,
they trade away their stock holding to a zero position.
In the above expression, note that the case of (μ0 − δ) − ρ0+ρρ (μ0 − p) ≤ s ≤ (μ0 +
δ) − ρ0+ρ
ρ
(μ0 − p) corresponds to a situation where I-investors trade from their non-zero
initial stock position to a zero position in the stock. Thus, this demand does not represent
a no-trade position since aggregate trade is then xI0 > 0.
I-investors’ demand also exhibits two interesting and complementary phenomena. The
ﬁrst is that for any given signal value s, there exists a range of prices for which it is optimal for
I-investors to trade away their stock holdings to a zero position (θI = 0). This corresponds to
portfolio inertia in prices at the risk-free portfolio ﬁrst noted by Dow and da Costa Werlang
(1992b).16
The second fact is that for a given price p, I-investors will ﬁnd it optimal to trade to a
zero position under distinct signals s, s′ when
s, s′ ∈
[
(μ0 − δ)− ρ0 + ρ
ρ
(μ0 − p), (μ0 + δ)− ρ0 + ρ
ρ
(μ0 − p)
]
. (9)
That is, at θI(s) = θI(s′) = 0, there is portfolio inertia with respect to information (Condie
and Ganguli (2011a)).17 The range of signals for which I-investors exhibit portfolio inertia
in information at a given price p is characterized below as a corollary of Lemma 1.
Corollary 1. I-investors trade away their stockholding at a given price p for an interval of
signal values with length 2δ and upper bound b, where
b = (μ0 + δ)− ρ0 + ρ
ρ
(μ0 − p). (10)
The mid-point of this interval is given by
μ0 − ρ0 + ρ
ρ
(μ0 − p) (11)
We show below that this portfolio inertia in information leads to the existence of partially
16Given signal s, portfolio inertia in price would arise for all prices p, p′ that satisfy p, p′ ∈ [μI |s, μI |s].
17As evident from the above discussion and as noted in Condie and Ganguli (2011a) the property of
inertia in information and the property of inertia in price are distinct but related since both obtain from the
non-diﬀerentiability of the MEU criterion.
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revealing REE.18 Whether or not the price incorporates the ambiguity premium of δρ plays
an important role in informational ineﬃciency since it determines whether the inertia position
is optimal. Finally, note also that this inertia does not appear in smooth models of preferences
and so these models will not display the partial revelation property we study here.
3 Equilibrium partial revelation
3.1 The necessity of inertia for partial revelation
Non-revelation of signals s and s′ requires that p(s) = p(s′). If I-investors ﬁnd it optimal
to not trade away their stock holdings then the equilibrium price will be monotone in the
signal and hence revealing, as the next result shows.
Proposition 2. If markets clear at signal value s with θI(s) = 0, then the market clearing
stock price reveals signal s in rational expectations equilibrium.
Thus, the existence of partial revelation requires that for a given price there is a range
of signals for which I-investors wish to trade to a zero position in the stock. Moreover, we
note that for θI(s) = 0, the market clearing price at s must include an ambiguity premium
over and above the usual market risk premium.
Corollary 2. If markets clear with θI(s) = 0, the market clearing price p(s) includes the
usual market risk premium γ
ρ0+ρ
and an additional ambiguity premium xI0
δρ
ρ0+ρ
.
3.2 Uninformed investor demand
The above requirements of optimality and market-clearing with θI = 0 for partial revelation
are related to and complicated by the fact that U-investors infer information from the pre-
vailing price. This inference potentially leads to changes in the beliefs of U-investors which
leads to changes in market prices. Thus, equilibrium prices and the beliefs of U-investors
must be solved for simultaneously.
The solution to this problem is a set of signals that are not revealed in REE and beliefs
for U-investors that are consistent with the knowledge that a signal in the set of unrevealed
signals has been received. Given Corollary 1 and Proposition 2, we demonstrate the existence
18Condie and Ganguli (2011a) ﬁrst noted this property and used it in the context of general ﬁnancial
market economies to establish robust existence of partially revealing REE when payoﬀ states and signals can
take only ﬁnitely many values, unlike the case here with normally distributed payoﬀ and signal structures.
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of partially revealing REE by conjecturing and verifying the existence of an interval [b−2δ, b]
of signals that will not be revealed, while signals outside the interval [b− 2δ, b] are revealed.
The ﬁrst step is to characterize U-investor demand when signals in [b − 2δ, b] are not
revealed and those outside of [b− 2δ, b] are revealed for a given price p.
Proposition 3. If s ∈ [b − 2δ, b] are not revealed and s /∈ [b − 2δ, b] are revealed at stock
price p, the optimal portfolio for U-investors under updated beliefs about v at stock price p
is given by
θU(s) =
⎧⎨
⎩γ
−1(ρ0 + ρ)(μ0 +
ρ
ρ0+ρ
(s− μ0)− p) if s /∈ [b− 2δ, b]
γ−1ρ0
(
μ0 +
ρ
ρ0+ρ
Δ
(
b− 2δ + γθU (s)
ρ0
, b+ γθ
U (s)
ρ0
)
− p
)
if s ∈ [b− 2δ, b],
(12)
where
Δ
(
b− 2δ + γθU (s)
ρ0
, b+ γθ
U (s)
ρ0
)
=
√
ρ0+ρ
ρ0ρ
[
φ
(√
ρ0ρ
ρ0+ρ
(
b−2δ−μ0+ γθ
U (s)
ρ0
))
−φ
(√
ρ0ρ
ρ0+ρ
(
b−μ0+ γθ
U (s)
ρ0
))
Φ
(√
ρ0ρ
ρ0+ρ
(
b−μ0+ γθU (s)ρ0
))
−Φ
(√
ρ0ρ
ρ0+ρ
(
b−2δ−μ0+ γθU (s)ρ0
))
]
(13)
Note that for s ∈ [b − 2δ, b], U-investor demand θU(s) is constant in s and deﬁned
implicitly, while for s /∈ [b − 2δ, b], θU(s) is monotone in s and a closed form expression is
available.
3.3 Partially revealing REE price function
Using Proposition 3 and the market clearing condition (5), the next result (Proposition 4)
characterizes the unique partially revealing REE price function, trade volume, and the mass
of unrevealed signals. Conditions for existence of the partially revealing equilibrium are
given in Proposition 5 below.
Proposition 4. Suppose I investors observe private signal s.
1. The market clearing price pPR(·) when θI(·) = 0 satisﬁes
pPR(s) = μ0 +
ρ
ρ0 + ρ
(ψ(s)− μ0)− γ
xU0
1
ρ0 + ρ
(14)
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where
ψ(s) =
⎧⎨
⎩s if s /∈ [b− 2δ, b]μ0 +Δ(b+ γxU0 ρ0 − 2δ, b+ γxU0 ρ0
)
− γ
xU0 ρ0
if s ∈ [b− 2δ, b]
(15)
This function is non-linear in s and discontinuous at b− 2δ and b.
2. The length of the interval of signals [b − 2δ, b] where pPR(·) does not reveal the signal
is 2δ.
3. Trade volume is xI0 for all s.
Figure 1(a) illustrates the price function. It follows from the characterization of the
partially revealing price function in (14)-(15) that price volatility is higher when information
is revealed than when it is not, since changes in price are the mechanism through which
information is transmitted.19
Using the relation between b and price in (10) (Corollary 1) and the expression for the
price when s ∈ [b−2δ, b] in (14) yields that the existence of an interval [b−2δ, b] of unrevealed
signals and hence the existence of partially revealing REE follows from the existence of a
solution b to the following equation.
b+
γ
xU0 ρ0
− μ0 −Δ
(
b+
γ
xU0 ρ0
− 2δ, b+ γ
xU0 ρ0
)
= δ − γ
xU0 ρ
(16)
The next result establishes that a solution to (16) always exists and is unique when the
additional ambiguity premium required by I-investors (Corollary 2) above the usual market
risk premium is larger than the premium that would be required by U-investors to hold all of
the stock (as discussed in the following section). There is no closed form analytical solution
for b generally, though one can be found numerically.
Proposition 5. Markets clear with θI(s) = 0 for all s and an interval [b−2δ, b] of unrevealed
signals, with b unique, exists if and only if γ ∈ [0, xU0 δρ].
The partially revealing equilibrium price reveals s when s /∈ [b − 2δ, b] and obscures s if
s ∈ [b− 2δ, b] as conjectured and trading volume is xI0 for all s. As discussed in Section 3.1,
θI(s) = 0 at market-clearing if price does not incorporate the ambiguity premium. On the
19Diﬀering volatility across regimes is suggestive of time-varying volatility in dynamic models, see Ander-
sen, Bollerslev, and Diebold (2009) for an introduction to the extensive literature on time-varying volatility.
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other hand, for U-investors to to hold all the stock, the price must incorporate a premium
related to xU0 , as discussed below. The partially revealing REE exists when this premium is
lower than the ambiguity premium I-investors require to hold the stock. This is true for all
s when γ
xU0
≤ δρ.
Condie and Ganguli (2011a) showed that partially revealing REE exist when ambiguity
averse investors observe private information. However, the characterization and existence of
partial revelation in the present setting are not corollaries of the Condie and Ganguli (2011a)
results since those results are established for a setting with ﬁnitely many states and signal
values unlike the present setting. Moreover, Condie and Ganguli (2011a) do not explicitly
model the link between information and updated beliefs, unlike the present setting and so
do not deal with the inference problem for U investors and the consequent existence problem
as discussed in Proposition 3 and Proposition 5.20
4 Pricing implications of partial revelation
In this section, we establish the eﬀects of partial revelation of ambiguous private information.
In order to demarcate the eﬀects due to partial revelation, we provide comparisons with two
benchmark economies, which we describe ﬁrst. Both of these benchmarks are informationally
eﬃcient, i.e. the REE price function is fully revealing in each.
4.1 Benchmark economies
The ﬁrst benchmark economy, which we term the full information economy, is the economy
where I investors and U investors are as in the current economy, but there is no asymmetry
of information. This benchmark full information economy is what would obtain in a fully
revealing REE, where price reveals the signal to U investors and I investors trade away their
asset holdings to U investors. We establish that this fully revealing equilibrium exists when
γ ∈ [0, δxU0 ρ] in the proof of Proposition 11 below.
20The existence results are established in diﬀerent parameter spaces and so need to be stated and estab-
lished independently. The parameter space in Condie and Ganguli (2011a) is the space of belief representa-
tions taking the endowment distributions and risk preferences as primitive while the result in Proposition 5
takes the belief representation (normal distributions) as primitive and establishes existence in the space of
risk preference (γ) and endowment distributions (xU0 ) given ambiguity δ and signal error precision ρ. The
conceptual link between the two existence results is that ﬁnding the equilibrium beliefs of the traders is key
to ﬁnding the equilibrium price function and vice versa.
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In the fully revealing case, the price function, denoted pFR(·), is given by
pFR(s) = μ0 +
ρ
ρ0 + ρ
(s− μ0)− γ
xU0
1
ρ0 + ρ
. (17)
The full information benchmark and the partially revealing equilibrium therefore only diﬀer
in the fact that in the latter, information is not revealed to U investors.
The second benchmark economy, which we term the no ambiguity economy, is charac-
terized by I investors who do not perceive any ambiguity in the signal (δ = 0) and like U
investors consider the signal to be unbiased. That is, this economy is populated only by
(Savage 1954) SEU investors. In this economy, the REE price is always fully revealing, so
there is no asymmetry of information as in the ﬁrst benchmark. However, in this economy,
the I investors do not trade away their stock holding in equilibrium. Full revelation in this
no-ambiguity economy essentially follows from the results of Grossman (1976) and Radner
(1979), but we state and prove the result for completeness.
Proposition 6. Suppose δ = 0. Then there exists a fully revealing equilibrium, which is the
unique rational expectations equilibrium.
The equilibrium price function in the no-ambiguity economy is denoted pNA(·) and given
by
pNA(s) = μ0 +
ρ
ρ0 + ρ
(s− μ0)− γ
ρ0 + ρ
. (18)
The only diﬀerence in prices between the full information and the no ambiguity benchmarks
is the term 1
xU0
found in the risk premium. This term captures the premium due to the
reduction in stockholders from I investors and U investors in the no ambiguity economy to
only U investors in the full information economy. This reduction is due to the ambiguity
aversion of the I investors and has been noted previously in the literature, for example in
Easley and O’Hara (2009) and Cao, Wang, and Zhang (2005).
In the full information economy, U investors require a premium of γ(xU0 (ρ0 + ρ))
−1 to
hold all the stock and we refer to this as the reduced stockholders market risk premium.
It comprises two portions. One is determined by xU0 and measures the premium due to
the reduction in the mass of stockholders as noted above. If xU0 is small, U-investors are
required to purchase a large fraction of the total asset stock from I-investors when the latter
wish to trade to a zero position. This purchase involves an increasingly risky portfolio and
U-investors require an increasing amount of compensation to take on this additional risk.
However, if xU0 is large, then U-investors own most of the market and taking on the remainder
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of the assets does not greatly increase the compensation they require. The other portion of
the premium is determined by γ(ρ0+ρ)
−1 which measures the risk premium due to the risk
faced by U-investors with risk aversion γ and conditional stock payoﬀ volatility (ρ0 + ρ)
−1.
In short, comparing the full information and no ambiguity benchmarks provides the
eﬀect of ambiguity aversion in the absence of information asymmetry. However, when there
is information asymmetry, as in the partially revealing equilibrium, there are additional
eﬀects which we describe next.
4.2 Premia due to unrevealed information
The partially-revealing price function pPR in (14) diﬀers from the prices in the two bench-
marks. When information is not revealed, i.e. U-investors know only that s ∈ [b− 2δ, b], the
price pPR includes a premium
− ρ
ρ0 + ρ
(ψ(s)− μ0) = − ρ
ρ0 + ρ
(
Δ
(
b− 2δ + γ
xU0 ρ0
, b+
γ
xU0 ρ0
)
− γ
xU0 ρ0
)
. (19)
We refer to this as the unrevealed information premium (UIP). This premium is novel
to this paper and is the reduction in price required by U-investors when they know there
is information in the market that they haven’t observed (see Proposition 7 below). For
s ∈ [b− 2δ, b], the premium is measured by
−
(
Δ
(
b− 2δ + γ
xU0 ρ0
, b+
γ
xU0 ρ0
)
− γ
xU0 ρ0
)
. (20)
The next result characterizes the UIP and its relation to the market risk premium and
describes how U-investors perceive unrevealed information.
Proposition 7. The following hold in the partially revealing equilibrium.
1. The unrevealed information premium is positive and increasing in γ whenever γ is
positive.
2. If information is not revealed then the unrevealed information premium exceeds that
measured by the expected value of unrevealed information,
−
(
Δ
(
b− 2δ + γ
xU0 ρ0
, b+
γ
xU0 ρ0
)
− γ
xU0 ρ0
)
≥ −(E[s|s ∈ [b− 2δ, b]]− μ0) (21)
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and U-investors consider unrevealed information to be, on average, bad news, i.e.
E[s|s ∈ [b− 2δ, b]] ≤ μ0.
Unsurprisingly, as U investors’ risk aversion increases the premium that they require
for unrevealed information increases. Comparing the unrevealed information premium to
a benchmark given by the average value of unrevealed information clariﬁes the nature of
unrevealed news. When information is not revealed, the risk averse U investors require
a premium which exceeds that given by the average value of unrevealed information. So,
the price that I investors receive is lowered by more than the average value of unrevealed
information. For I investors to sell their stockholding at a price with this discount, given
the price function, U investors infer that the news that they observe but is not revealed by
price must be bad news on average. That is, the asymmetry that unrevealed information is
considered bad news on average arises from interaction of the risk aversion of the U investors
and the feature that I investors accept a constant price to sell their stockholding for a range
of information, i.e. exhibit portfolio inertia in information.21
Figure 1(b) illustrates the features of equilibrium given in Proposition 7. The set [b−2δ, b]
of unrevealed signal values moves to the left and the price in the partial-revelation region
declines as the risk aversion increases due to the increase in the UIP. When the risk aversion
is zero or moderate, both moderately good news (s > μ0) and bad news (s < μ0) are
not revealed. Similar results apply if we consider instead the premium γ
xU0 ρ0
as the varying
parameter.
Proposition 5 and Proposition 7 highlight the role that the relative market share of I-
investors plays in the revelation of information. From these two results it follows that if the
market share of those who have received the private signal is large enough, non-revelation of
information will not occur. That is, if enough investors in the market know the information,
it will be revealed. As the market share of those who are privately informed increases, so
does the market risk premium. U-investors are required to hold an increasingly large portion
of the market and must be compensated to do so. As this market risk premium increases, the
willingness of I-investors to hold the stock increases which in turn leads to their information
being revealed.
21The unrevealed information premium is the equilibrium risk premium required by the CARA utility U
investors when facing a non-normal distribution for v. The diﬀerence between the conditional average of
unrevealed signals and the prior mean is a natural benchmark to compare this premium with and it is not
a priori obvious whether the premium, which potentially depends on third or higher order moments of the
non-normal distribution, would be lower or higher. Our result shows that the premium is higher than the
benchmark.
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Finally, we note that Proposition 4.2 implies that the informativeness of prices depends
fundamentally on the amount of ambiguity in the signal. As ambiguity, measured by δ,
increases so does the set of signals that don’t get revealed in equilibrium. Market environ-
ments that are characterized by large amounts of ambiguous information will also tend to
have prices that are less informative.
4.3 Jumps and ampliﬁcation
The partially revealing price function is suggestive of crashes, jumps, and ampliﬁcation of
small changes in news (s). Since s is the private information of I investors, these eﬀects are
illustrated in terms of prices, which are publicly observable.22 To illustrate this we compare
the partially revealing price with the full information benchmark price. Comparing with the
no-ambiguity benchmark price would give similar results.
In the benchmark full information economy, price pFR is linear and strictly increasing in
s with no points of discontinuity. The discontinuity in pPR is suggestive of jumps and crashes
relative to the full information benchmark and provides an ampliﬁcation mechanism, wherein
small diﬀerences in news s lead to relatively large changes in price pPR. This ampliﬁcation
can be quantiﬁed in terms of the diﬀerence in volatility of partially revealing and fully
revealing price in neighborhoods of the points of discontinuity.
Near the upper discontinuity point b, if the news is just slightly better, then it will be
revealed through a discontinuous increase in price. This is true for all unrevealed signals
that are better news than the average of the unrevealed signals. On the other hand, this
price jump will be negative if the revealed signal is worse than the average unrevealed signal,
and hence is below b − 2δ. Similarly, a change from revelation to non revelation of signals
is accompanied by a discontinuous change in price as U-investors’ information changes from
an exact signal value to a set of possible signal values. Figure 2 depicts this ampliﬁcation in
terms of the relative volatility of prices for signals close to b.
The comparative statics for price volatility and discontinuous price changes from these
results are suggestive of interesting properties that may arise in an intertemporal setting,
where information is recieved every period but informational eﬃciency of price change across
periods. For example, a change from periods of information non-revelation to those with
revelation may coincide with a intial large change in price relative to the change in news,
an increase in price volatility, and expectation of continuing higher volatility. On the other
22The ampliﬁcation would arise if we compared pPR and s directly as well, but we do not do so here since
s is in principle not publicly observable.
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hand, with a change in the other direction, a relatively large initial price change, lower
volatility, and expectation of lower future volatility may arise.23
These mechanisms and results are diﬀerent from those in other papers. For example,
Illeditsch (2011) shows that in a market with a representative ambiguity and risk averse
investor holding the stock, there is an interval of market-clearing prices when a public signal
conﬁrms the prior mean. The multiplicity of prices arises due to the ambiguity averse
investor’s worst-case assessment (as measured by the variance of the signal) changing as the
signal changes. This multiplicity of prices can act as an ampliﬁcation mechanism for small
changes in news due to the fundamental indeterminacy of prices.
This can be quantiﬁed by the higher volatility of price relative to the volatility of news.
In contrast, our ampliﬁcation result does not rely on ambiguity averse investors holding the
stock, indeed the marginal investors are ambiguity-neutral. The worst-case assessment of the
ambiguity averse I investors does not change around the points of discontinuity.24 The result
is due to the change in the inference of the U investors from a point to a set or vice versa at
the points of discontinuity. Moreover, our result does not rely on equilibrium indeterminacy,
since the partially revealing price function is discontinuous but unique and so the limit price
of a sequence of news signal converging to b (or b − 2δ) is distinct from the limit of the
corresponding price sequence. Moreover, the result in this paper holds with risk neutrality
as well.
Mele and Sangiorgi (2015) ﬁnd multiplicity of equilibria in the information market when
ambiguity averse investors acquire costly information and there is noise-based partial reve-
lation in the ﬁnancial market. Multiplicity of information market equilibria leads to price
swings in the ﬁnancial market due to switching between information market equilibria with
changes in the level of uncertainty. In contrast, our result on price swings does not rely on
multiple information market equilibria and arises due to discontinuity in the unique partially
revealing equilibrium.
4.4 Implications for return moments.
The partially revealing equilibrium also has implications for the distribution of returns that
are consistent with stylized facts of returns for the aggregate market index and in the cross
section in the US. An extensive literature exists regarding the moments of excess returns
23We emphasize that this is just an illustration of possible richer implications in an intertemporal setting.
A formal development of such a setting is left for future research.
24The worst case assessment is always given by −δ around b.
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for the aggregate market and cross section.25 This literature documents that the equity
premium and return volatility are higher than is implied by many existing estimates of
investor risk aversion and models of asset prices. Returns for the aggregate market and
in the cross-section are negatively skewed and leptokurtic. Campbell, Lo, and Mackinlay
(1995) documents evidence for the aggregate stock market on all four moments using daily
and monthly returns data.26 For the cross section, Conrad, Dittmar, and Ghysels (2013)
document evidence on skewness and kurtosis using daily and monthly returns data.27
Since the model has just a single risky asset it is natural to interpret the results in terms of
the aggregate market returns. However, it also is natural to interpret the private information
setting in the context of the cross section rather than the aggregate market. Nothing in our
analysis precludes interpreting the results in relation to the cross section. We do not provide
a multi-asset version of the model, but such an analysis would be feasible and a careful study
of the covariance structure of assets in the cross section together with the partial revelation
of ambiguous private information for some or all of the cross-section would likely yield richer
implications than those we document here.28
The static CARA-Normal framework used in this paper is not directly comparable to
the empirical evidence in the literature, so we compare with the two benchmark models
within the CARA-Normal framework to illustrate the marginal impact of non-revelation of
ambiguous private information to an otherwise standard CARA-Normal model.29
The results in this section indicate that partial revelation due to the presence of ambigu-
ous private information leads to a higher equity premium and higher return volatility than
the benchmark economies. More interestingly, under partial revelation, returns are nega-
tively skewed and leptokurtic for a range of parameter values. In contrast, in the benchmark
25Given our normalization of the risk-free rate, excess return coincide with stock return in our setting.
26See, for example, Table 1.1 of Campbell, Lo, and Mackinlay (1995). More recently, Albuquerque (2012)
documents negative skewness for the the aggregate market using daily returns data.
27Harvey and Siddique (2000) document evidence on skewness in the cross section using monthly data while
Dittmar (2002) documents evidence on kurtosis for the cross section of returns for annual data. Harvey and
Siddique (2000) are primarily concerned with conditional skewness in the intertemporal asset pricing context,
but document unconditional skewness as well.
28A natural question is whether asset speciﬁc ambiguous private information for individual assets could
be diversiﬁed away if there are many assets and the equilibrium price function approaches a linear price
function. However, the work of Epstein and Schneider (2008) (section B.3) and Epstein and Schneider
(2007) (Theorem 1 and related discussion) suggests that the eﬀects ambiguous information will not be
diversiﬁed away. Moreover, a private information setting such as in this paper is likely to provide much
richer implications. We leave this for future research.
29The results from the static framework in this paper are only suggestive. A more comprehensive quanti-
tative exercise is beyond the scope of this paper.
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economies, returns are not skewed and do not exhibit excess kurtosis. We illustrate the
eﬀects of partial revelation in comparison to the informationally eﬃcient benchmarks for all
four moments below.
Our results below also show that ambiguity itself, without asymmetry of information,
only aﬀects the ﬁrst moment of the return distribution. That is, the full information and
no-ambiguity benchmarks only diﬀer in terms of the equity premium. Ambiguity itself, as
captured in the full information economy benchmark has no eﬀect on the volatility, skewness,
and kurtosis of returns. It is the interplay of private information and ambiguity as captured
in the partial information economy which has an eﬀect on the higher order moments of
returns.
4.4.1 The equity premium
The equity premium in the partially revealing equilibrium exceeds the premium in the full
information and no-ambiguity benchmarks.
Proposition 8. For all γ ∈ (0, δxU0 ρ), E[v − pPR] > E[v − pFR] > E[v − pNA].
Figure 3 demonstrates the impact on the equity premium from partial revelation relative
to the two benchmarks discussed previously for diﬀerent levels of γ and δ. First, note
that the equity premium is always higher in the full information economy (dashed curves)
than in the no-ambiguity economy (dotted curves) for all γ and δ. This diﬀerence is due
to the reduced stockholder market risk premium. Ambiguity averse investors trade away
their stockholding when the price does not include an ambiguity premium (Proposition 1),
while ambiguity-neutral investors hold the stock when compensated through the market risk
premium.
However, as can be seen in both graphs, there is an additional premium in the partial
information economy (solid curves) relative to the full information economy. This is the UIP
which compensates U-investors for holding the stock in the partially revealing equilibrium
and it increases in δ, since the amount of information revealed decreases (Proposition 4.2).
On the other hand, the UIP is non-monotonic in γ. There are two opposing eﬀects on the
UIP as γ changes and these underlie the non-monotonicity.
Since b is decreasing in γ (Proposition 7 and Figure 1(b)) the set of unrevealed signals
shifts to the left as γ increases. This shift implies that conditional on non-revelation, the
unrevealed information is worse (μ0 − (b− 2δ) is higher). On the other hand, as b decreases,
the probability that I investors receive a signal in the set of unrevealed signals decreases.
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As γ increases from 0, initially the U investors risk aversion is low enough that the UIP is
positive but not very high relative to the full information and no-ambiguity benchmarks.
However, for higher values of γ the worsening nature of unrevealed information implies that
the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates and the UIP increases. Eventually, with high enough γ, the second
eﬀect dominates and the UIP decreases with increasing γ.
4.4.2 Return volatility
Figure 4 provides the unconditional variance of asset returns (v − p) as a function of γ and
δ. The volatility of returns is higher in the partial information economy relative to both
benchmark economies and is increasing in δ and decreasing in γ. Return volatility increases
with δ because the size of the unrevealed information region increases. Since asset return
variance is composed of both the conditional variance of asset returns given the signal, and
the marginal variance of the signal, these two sources of variance lead to greater asset return
variance when ambiguity is large.
Return volatility decreases in γ because b decreases, which implies a decreasing proba-
bility that the I investors observe information that is not revealed. This in turn implies a
decrease in the return volatility.
Yu (2014) uses a related framework to study a dynamic economy with collateral con-
straints and asymmetric ambiguous information about the growth rate of dividends. Yu
(2014) assumes that ambiguity averse investors can observe a private signal with two values:
one which indicates high dividend growth and the other low growth, unlike the normally
distributed signals observed here. He shows that when price does not distinguish whether
a high growth signal or low growth signal was received, the conditional volatility of future
returns and conditional risk premia are higher than if the price reveals these, unlike the
unconditional moments we study.30
4.4.3 Return skewness
The non-linearity in pPR(·) leads to negatively skewed returns when traders are risk averse
(γ > 0), as shown in Figure 5. There is no skewness in the returns of either of the two
30Price volatility can exceed fundamental volatility as measured by the stock payoﬀ in the presence of
ambiguity aversion. Ozsoylev and Werner (2011) show that in the presence of ambiguity averse uninformed
investors if the volatility of noise trading is high enough, then price volatility can exceed stock payoﬀ volatility.
Dow and da Costa Werlang (1992a) provides an example of excess volatility due to a violation of the standard
Bayesian variance decomposition formula under ambiguity, which is not required here. Mandler (2012) shows
excess volatility relative to a stochastic technology parameter in a sequential production economy.
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benchmark economies. In the partially revealing REE, on the other hand, negative skewness
in returns arises. In this REE, there is positive probability mass at the non-revealing price
value, corresponding to the probability mass of the range of unrevealed bad news. Negative
skewness arises since this price value is lower than the price value that would be implied by
the average value of unrevealed information, as noted in (21).
Returns in the partial information economy are more negatively skewed as δ increases,
as shown in the right panel of Figure 5. A higher δ implies a larger range of unrevealed
information, i.e. a larger range where price is constant, which leads to greater skewness in
returns.
The eﬀect of increasing γ on skewness is non-monotonic as a result of the interplay of the
two eﬀects noted in the discussion of volatility – worsening news and decreasing probability.
When γ = 0, since the non-revelation region is symmetric around the mean μ0, non-revelation
does not introduce skewness into the distribution of v−p. As γ increases, b decreases, moving
the region to the left. Initially, the eﬀect from worsening news dominates and the skewness
becomes more negative. However, as γ becomes large enough the lower probability eﬀect
dominates and returns become less negatively skewed.
Epstein and Schneider (2008) show that with a representative ambiguity averse investor
holding stocks, negative skewness can arise in returns.31 In contrast, in our model skewness
arises even when the marginal stockholder is ambiguity neutral. Yuan (2005) shows that
when borrowing constraints are present in a noise-based CARA-normal partial revelation
setting, negative skewness arises due to non-linearity of the partially revealing price function.
In recent work, Palvolgyi and Venter (2015) show that negative skewness can arise conditional
on low prices in a noise-based CARA-Normal partial revelation setting, when considering
partially revealing equilibria where the price function is discontinuous. Our result documents
unconditional negative skewness in returns in line with the evidence in the literature noted
previously for the aggregate stock returns and for returns in the cross section.
4.4.4 Return kurtosis
As illustrated in Figure 6, returns may be leptokurtic in the partial information economy
relative to the two benchmarks, which exhibit no kurtosis. The mechanism which leads to
excess kurtosis is essentially similar to that for negative skewness, i.e. positive probability
of the non-revealing price value and this value being lower than the average of the unre-
31More precisely, in the inter-temporal setting of Epstein and Schneider (2008), negative skewness arises
when the investor’s inter-temporal discount rate is low, such as for high frequency data.
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vealed information. The eﬀect of increasing γ on excess kurtosis is non-monotone because
of the eﬀects of worsening unrevealed information and decreasing probability of unrevealed
information as in the case of the other moments.
However, unlike the other moments, excess kurtosis is not monotone in δ. As δ increases
b increases and b − 2δ decreases. This implies an increase in the probability of the interval
at the expense of probability of realizations to the left and the right of the range. When
the interval is relatively small, the reduction in probability of realizations above b imply
relatively large increases in the probability of the tails of the distribution of return. This
implies that the kurtosis of returns exceeds that of the normal distribution. However, as
the interval gets wider, especially as b increases, probability mass from relatively extreme
positive realizations is transferred toward the center. Eventually, this consolidation eﬀect
dominates and kurtosis falls below that of the normal distribution.
5 Public information
Public information aﬀects both I- and U-investors by reducing the disparity in their beliefs,
which aﬀects prices and informational eﬃciency. To model this, suppose all investors observe
a public signal
ζ = v + ζ , (22)
where ζ is normally distributed with mean 0 and precision ρζ . Since public information is
observed by all investors we assume for simplicity that it is unambiguous.
Let ρˆ0 = ρ0 + ρζ and μˆ0(ζ) = (ρ0μ0 + ρζζ)/ρˆ0. I-investors’ updated beliefs about v with
both the public and private information are characterized as follows.
Lemma 2. I-investors’ updated beliefs about v with the public signal ζ and private signal s
are represented by the set of distributions with precision ρˆ+ ρ and means
[
μI |(s, ζ), μI |(s, ζ)] = [ ρˆ0μˆ0(ζ) + ρ (s− δ)
ρˆ0 + ρ
,
ρˆ0μˆ0(ζ) + ρ (s+ δ)
ρˆ0 + ρ
]
. (23)
Reasoning similar to that for Proposition 4 yields that with public information, a range
of unrevealed private information will exist when the market risk premium doesn’t exceed
the ambiguity premium. The range will have length 2δ as before but the bounds will be
distinct depending on the public signal. Denote the range of unrevealed private information
by [bζ − 2δ, bζ ].
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Proposition 9. Suppose public signal ζ is observed by the investors.
1. An interval of unrevealed private signals [bζ −2δ, bζ ] exists if and only if γ ∈ [0, xU0 δρ],
where bζ is the unique solution to
bζ +
γ
xU0 ρˆ0
− μˆ0(ζ)−Δζ
(
bζ +
γ
xU0 ρˆ0
− 2δ, bζ + γ
xU0 ρˆ0
)
= δ − γ
xU0 ρ
(24)
2. The partially revealing price function with public information pPR(·, ζ) is given by
pPR(s, ζ) = μˆ0(ζ) +
ρ
ρˆ0 + ρ
(ψ(s, ζ)− μˆ0(ζ))− γ
xU0
1
ρˆ0 + ρ
(25)
where
ψ(s, ζ) =
{
s if s /∈ [bζ − 2δ, bζ ]
μˆ0(ζ) + Δζ
(
bζ − 2δ + γxU0 ρˆ0 , bζ +
γ
xU0 ρˆ0
)
− γ
xU0 ρˆ0
if s ∈ [bζ − 2δ, bζ ]
(26)
and
Δζ
(
bζ − 2δ + γxU0 ρˆ0 , bζ +
γ
xU0 ρˆ0
)
=
√
ρˆ0ρ
ρˆ0+ρ
⎡
⎣ φ
(√
ρˆ0ρ
ρˆ0+ρ
(
bζ−2δ−μˆ0(ζ)+ γ
xU0 ρˆ0
))
−φ
(√
ρˆ0ρ
ρˆ0+ρ
(
bζ−μˆ0(ζ)+ γ
xU0 ρˆ0
))
Φ
(√
ρˆ0ρ
ρˆ0+ρ
(
bζ−μˆ0(ζ)+ γ
xU0 ρˆ0
))
−Φ
(√
ρˆ0ρ
ρˆ0+ρ
(
bζ−2δ−μˆ0(ζ)+ γ
xU0 ρˆ0
))
⎤
⎦ (27)
The price function is non-linear in s and discontinuous at bζ − 2δ and bζ.
Figure 7 illustrates the eﬀect of public information which conﬁrms the prior mean, ζ = μ0.
This eﬀect is due to the increased precision (ρ0 + ρζ) under public information. The dotted
lines depict the price function with no public signal, while the solid lines depict the price
function for public signal ζ = μ0. With the public signal, the set of unrevealed private signals
comprises better private signal values relative to without the public signal, i.e. bζ > b. The
stock price with public information is higher for signal s when bζ − 2δ ≤ s ≤ b, but lower
when b− 2δ ≤ s < bζ − 2δ or b < s ≤ bζ .
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5.1 Eﬀects of public information: Unrevealed information and
price non-monotonicity
Public information aﬀects what private information is revealed and has implications for
stock price diﬀerent from those in standard settings such as the full information benchmark.
First, public information aﬀects the range of unrevealed private information. In particular,
good (resp. bad) public information, i.e. a public signal realization ζ¯ > μ0 (resp. ζ < μ0)
implies that better (resp. worse) private information is not revealed. That is, the interval of
unrevealed information lies to the right for good public information and to the left for bad
public information.
Second, the non-linear nature of the partially revealing price implies that the price for
a given private signal could be non-monotonic in small changes in the public information.
That is, the price could be lower (respectively, higher) when the public signal is slightly
higher (respectively, slightly lower). This is in contrast to the full information benchmark,
where price for a private signal changes monotonically with changes in public information.
We formalize these eﬀects of public information in Proposition 10, by comparing two
public signal realizations. One public signal realization conﬁrms the prior mean μ0 while the
other public signal realization is higher than the prior mean, ζ¯ > μ0. An analogous result
holds for the case where the public signal realization ζ is lower than μ0. Let bμ0 (respectively,
bζ¯) denote the upper bound of the non-revealed interval when the public signal realization
is μ0 (respectively, ζ¯).
Reasoning similar to that in the proof of Proposition 11 in Section 6.1, yields that with
public information, for any public signal realization ζ, the full information economy price
pFR(s, ζ) is given by
pFR(s, ζ) = μˆ0 +
ρ
ρˆ0 + ρ
(s− μˆ0(ζ))− γ
xU0 (ρˆ0 + ρ)
. (28)
Proposition 10. Let ζ¯ , μ0 be two realizations of the public signal, with ζ¯ > μ0. The following
hold.
1. bζ¯ > bμ0.
2. Suppose
μ0 < ζ¯ < μ0 +
ρˆ0
ρζ
ρ
ρˆ0 + ρ
(
δ − γ
xU0 ρ
)
. (29)
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Then for all s ∈ [bμ0 , bζ¯ ] ∪ [bμ0 − 2δ, bζ¯ − 2δ],
pPR(s, ζ¯) < pPR(s, μ0) (30)
and
pFR(s, ζ¯) > pFR(s, μ0) (31)
The condition (29) bounds the diﬀerence between the realizations of the public signal.
The non-monotonicity under partial revelation arises for all small changes in public infor-
mation which satisfy (29). For changes that violate the condition, the non-revealed region
price given ζ, pPR(·, ζ), for all private signals is higher than the revealed region price given
μ0, pPR(·, μ0).
To summarize, a small change in the range of unrevealed information implies price changes
that might otherwise be considered anomalous. Typically, one would expect a higher stock
price if ζ > μ0 (good news) relative to ζ = μ0 (neutral news. However, if the private
information s is bad news and is revealed when ζ > μ0 but not revealed when ζ = μ0,
then the price may be lower. The results of Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega (2007)
for the US stock market are suggestive that this non-monotonicity result may be relevant.
For example, they ﬁnd that in relatively high growth periods, good public news can lead to
decreases in asset prices (see pp.261-72).32
6 Model discussion and extensions
6.1 Noise-based partial revelation
The predominant approach to partial revelation introduces an exogenous source of stochastic
variation in price such as noise traders, endowment shocks or taste shocks. We refer to this
approach as the noise-based approach for brevity (see also Dow and Gorton (2008)). This
added variation implies changes in price that are not due solely to changes in information,
meaning price is not invertible as a function of private information and is therefore partially
32We do not claim that our static model’s result explains the wide-ranging evidence documented in An-
dersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega (2007), which examines multiple ﬁnancial markets and high frequency
data in these inter-temporal markets. However, their ﬁndings for the US stock market summarized in pp.
261-12 and on pp. 11-12 (in relation to Tables 5A and 5B) of the corresponding working paper Andersen,
Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega (2005) are suggestive that the result of Proposition 10 may be worth exploring
in an inter-temporal context.
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revealing.
In the widely-studied Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and related noise-based frameworks,
the price function that is usually analyzed is linear due to the assumption of normal dis-
tributions, CARA utility, no wealth constraints, and unambiguous beliefs. Two exceptions
are Marin and Olivier (2008) and Palvolgyi and Venter (2015). The ﬁrst paper incorporates
portfolio holding constraints into a CARA-normal REE model and establishes the existence
of a continuum of non-linear and discontinuous REE price functions. The Marin and Olivier
(2008) REE have a similar ﬂavour to the unique REE of this paper in that (i) there is a
discontinuity in the price function which coincides with the price function changing from a
revealing increasing function to a constant non-revealing function and (ii) private informa-
tion may be revealed even when informed traders’ portfolio holdings are constant. Palvolgyi
and Venter (2015) establish that REE with discontinuous price functions can exist as well in
the noisy CARA-normal setting, without any trading or portfolio constraints, yielding multi-
plicity of noise-based partially revealing REE. Diﬀerent distributional or utility assumptions
(Mailath and Sandroni (2003), Barlevy and Veronesi (2003), Vanden (2008), Breon-Drish
(2012)) or wealth constraints (Yuan (2005)) can also yield non-linear price functions, while
exogenous portfolio insurance or hedging demand can yield a discontinuous price function
(Gennotte and Leland (1990)).33
REE models with ambiguity averse traders and noise traders such as Ozsoylev andWerner
(2011) and Mele and Sangiorgi (2015) and without noise traders such as Easley, O’Hara, and
Yang (2011) feature continuous price functions. These papers diﬀer signiﬁcantly from the
present paper. In addition to having noise-based partial revelation unlike this paper, in
Ozsoylev and Werner (2011) ambiguity-averse traders do not receive any private signals nor
do they perceive any information to be ambiguous. Mele and Sangiorgi (2015)also have
noise-based partial revelation and private information in fact eliminates ex-ante ambiguity.
Moreover, Mele and Sangiorgi (2015) are interested in time-inconsistent decision-making
(Strotz (1955-1956)) by ambiguity averse investors, which has no role in our setting or
results. In Easley, O’Hara, and Yang (2011), ambiguity-averse, uninformed ‘simple’ traders
are ambiguous about the trading strategy of ‘opaque’ traders which yields a price function
which is not fully informative for the ‘simple’ traders.
Under the noise-based approach, partial revelation typically does not have volatility
implications beyond what noise adds in a manner qualitatively similar to how noise alters
volatility in a symmetric information setting. Another distinguishing feature is that in
33Price is discontinuous at a point in the noise variable in Barlevy and Veronesi (2003).
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common noise-based CARA-normal models information on trading volume makes partially
revealing prices fully revealing (Blume, Easley, and O’Hara (1994) and Schneider (2009)).
This is not true in the present framework since trade is constant at xI0 for all signals.
The noise-based approach is also used to rule out the existence of fully revealing REE and
provide a resolution to the Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) paradox of costly information ac-
quisition.34 Partial revelation under ambiguity in the competitive market setting of Sections
2-3 does not rule out full revelation REE; indeed one always exists as noted below.35
Proposition 11. A fully revealing REE always exists with ambiguous information.
Partial revelation under ambiguity involves a range of signal values not being revealed
and yields a non-linear discontinuous price function and variation in price volatility as noted
previously. Overall, the diﬀerences in partial revelation due to ambiguous information and
noise-based partial revelation suggest that in principle, these approaches may provide diﬀer-
ing testable implications and be useful in complementary ways for studying ﬁnancial markets.
6.2 Implementability of REE and costly information acquisition
6.2.1 Implementability of REE
The REE obtained in the competitive market common-value and common-signal setting of
Sections 3-4 are implementable as the equilibria of a trading game where traders submit
demand schedules, in the tradition of Kyle (1989). We ﬁrst establish implementability of the
fully revealing REE in the no ambiguity benchmark economy (Section 4.1). It is well known
that in a setting where the asset has common value and informed traders observe a common
signal (s here) the fully revealing REE is implementable (see eg. Vives (2008) Section 4.2.2).
However, we provide the analysis for completeness.
Proposition 12. Suppose δ = 0. There is a unique equilibrium with a linear price function
(18) where I traders use the following symmetric demand schedule which is linear in s, p
θˆINA(s, p) =
ρ0μ0
γ
+
ρ
γ
s− ρ0 + ρ
γ
p (32)
34Exceptions to this include Rostek and Weretka (2012), Vives (2011), and Vives (2014) which analyze
linear equilibria in a linear-quadratic / CARA-normal setting and do not rely on noise trading to obtain
partial revelation.
35The analyzes of Radner (1979), Grossman (1981), and Condie and Ganguli (2011b) also suggest that a
full revelation REE will exist.
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and U traders use the symmetric constant demand schedule
θˆNA(p) = 1. (33)
It is worth noting that the sensitivity of the demand schedule (32) to s is the mechanism
through which s is revealed. The quantity demanded by each I traders and U traders at the
market clearing revealing price is constant at 1 and 1 respectively across signal values, i.e.
there is no trade.
We now establish implementability of the fully revealing REE price function (17) (Section
4.1) and the partially revealing REE price (14) (Section 3) in the economy with ambiguity
averse I traders.
Proposition 13. Suppose δ > 0 and γ ∈ [0, xU0 δρ]. There exist two equilibria of the demand
schedule game where I traders submit the following symmetric demand schedule which is
piecewise linear in s, p
θˆI(s, p) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
ρ0μ0−δρ
γ
+ ρ
γ
s− ρ0+ρ
γ
p if ρ0μ0+ρ(s−δ)
ρ0+ρ
> p
0 if ρ0μ0+ρ(s−δ)
ρ0+ρ
≤ p ≤ ρ0μ0+ρ(s+δ)
ρ0+ρ
ρ0μ0+δρ
γ
+ ρ
γ
s− ρ0+ρ
γ
p if ρ0μ0+ρ(s+δ)
ρ0+ρ
< p
(34)
and U traders use the symmetric constant demand schedule
θˆ(p) =
1
xU0
. (35)
. There is an equilibrium with a linear fully revealing price function (17) and there is an
equilibrium with a non-linear and discontinuous partially revealing price function (14).
Note that in this game, the sensitivity of the ambiguity averse I traders’ demand schedule
(34) to s is the mechanism through which s is revealed. The quantity demanded by each I
trader and U trader at the market clearing and revealing price is constant at 0 and (xU0 )
−1
respectively, i.e. there is trade since I traders sell oﬀ their stockholding to U traders.
There is a multiplicity of market-clearing price functions due to the self-fulﬁlling nature
of equilibrium. The partially revealing price arises when the Walrasian auctioneer sets a
constant price across signal values to clear the market or equivalently, when U traders’
conjecture that I traders’ will trade at a constant price across a range of signal values. The
fully revealing price arises when the Walrasian auctioneer sets market-clearing prices which
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are always sensitive to signal values or equivalently when the U traders conjecture that I
traders will trade at a signal-sensitive price for all signal values.
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that the implementability of the equilibria with and
without ambiguity averse traders is due to the fact that all I traders observe a common
signal. Thus, price transmits information. In contrast, if the I traders observed diverse
signals, such as in Grossman (1976) or Vives (2014) more recently, then the equilibria would
not be implementable. With diverse signals, price would have to aggregate and transmit
information. As noted, for example, in Vives (2014), if the asset in such a setting has common
value across traders (like in this paper), then the fully revealing REE is not implementable
even in an economy with ambiguity neutral I traders. The reason is that the traders’ (linear)
demand schedule is constant across signal values. This issue would arise in an economy
with ambiguity averse I traders receiving diverse signals also. It is worth noting that the
problem pertains to the revealing part of the REE price function and not to the non-revealing
(constant) part.
On the other hand, Vives (2014) shows that if the informed traders’ values from the
stock are imperfectly correlated (private values) and traders receive diverse signals, then
fully revealing REE can be implemented as the outcome of a demand schedule submission
game.36 In Condie and Ganguli (2016), we analyse a setting with one ambiguity averse
informed trader and multiple uninformed ambiguity neutral strategic traders who compete
in a demand schedule game along the lines of Kyle (1989) and Vives (2014). Following Vives
(2014), we assume that the traders’ values from the stock are not perfectly correlated. The
presence of the ambiguity averse trader implies that the analysis is not a direct application
of the work of Kyle (1989) or Vives (2014) for the linear case since the trading strategies and
equilibrium price function may be non-linear, as suggested by the results of Proposition 13.
6.2.2 Costly information acquistion
This paper does not analyze costly information acquisition. Information used in ﬁnancial
markets may not always involve a direct cost. For example, information from a non-traded
asset like labor income, whose payoﬀ is correlated with, and hence informative about, the
stock payoﬀ will yield a similar information structure (see section B.1). However, costly
information acquisition is a natural question to consider. In the common value and common
36Vives (2014) assumes risk-neutral traders who face linear marginal transaction costs, but the results of
his analysis apply to the CARA-normal setting as well. Vives (2011) and Rostek and Weretka (2012) also
have related analysis.
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signal setting of this paper, I traders will not acquire costly information under the partially
or fully revealing REE.
On the other hand, Vives (2014) provides a resolution to the Grossman and Stiglitz (1980)
paradox of costly information acquisition and informational eﬃciency of price by providing
conditions under which costly information is acquired when the equilibrium price function
is privately revealing (see Proposition 2 and the related discussion on pp. 1214-1215).37 38
The analysis of Vives (2014) suggests that costly information acquisition may occur in
the setting of Condie and Ganguli (2016) and the analysis of this very interesting issue is
a matter of future research. The analysis of Vives (2014) does not apply directly since the
equilibrium price in Condie and Ganguli (2016) is not linear, unlike in Vives (2014).39
6.3 Inertial behavior and non-revelation of information
Portfolio inertia in information (section 2.3) is the key behavioral property underlying the
non-revelation of information. Similar choice behavior may obtain due to sources diﬀerent
from that studied here and if so the framework and approach developed in this paper could
be applied to study information revelation in those models.
For instance, an alternative preference-based source of inertia could be appropriately
speciﬁed prospect-theoretic preferences as in Pasquariello (2012). The ambiguity averse rep-
resentation and belief assumptions here and the speciﬁc preferences in Pasquariello (2012)
both imply zero stockholding at a given price for a range of signals, though the overall demand
for the latter is more complex than the one in (8). It would be interesting, but beyond the
scope of the present paper to compare the general implications of these diﬀering demand ex-
pressions.40 One diﬀerence that suggests itself more generally is that non-smooth ambiguity
averse preferences could allow for inertia at non-zero stockholding in addition, see for exam-
ple, section 3.1.2 of Epstein and Schneider (2010) for an instance of non-diﬀerentiability at
positive stockholding with multiple-prior mean-variance preferences. For prospect-theoretic
preferences analyzed in Pasquariello (2012) inertia arises only at the reference point. This
37A privately revealing equilibrium is one where the price and the private information of a trader together
comprise a suﬃcient statistic for the pooled information of all traders in the market.
38Bernardo and Judd (2000), Muendler (2007), and Krebs (2007) provide alternative analyses showing
co-existence of informationally eﬃcient prices and costly information acquisition in a competitive market
setting.
39Moreover, the analysis of Mele and Sangiorgi (2015) indicates subtle issues involving time inconsistency
may need to be dealt with when analysing costly information acquisition by ambiguity averse traders.
40As noted earlier, Pasquariello (2012) studies noise-based partial revelation and does not explore impli-
cations of the preference structure for information transmission by price.
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is suggestive that the ambiguity preference structure may have richer implications, an inter-
esting subject for future research.
While the present paper shows non-revelation in a trading environment that is frictionless
following any signal realization and with investors whose preferences are classical in the sense
of being convex but non-smooth and broader than the Savage (1954) class, it may be possible
for inertia to obtain in frictional trading environments with smooth preferences, eg. in the
Savage (1954) class. These frictions include transactions costs (Vissing-Jorgensen (2002))
or portfolio constraints such as short sale constraints (Diamond and Verrecchia (1987)) or
constraints from agency frictions (Almazan, Brown, Carlson, and Chapman (2004)) and
may lead to no trade in equilibrium. A detailed analysis of the possibility of inertia, related
non-revelation, and its implications with such frictions is an interesting subject for future
research.41
7 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we show that partially revealing REE arise and aﬀect market variables when
private information is received by ambiguity averse investors who exhibit portfolio inertia
with respect to information. This property of investor behaviour arises under the MEU
decision-making criteria axiomatized in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989).
Partial revelation of information leads to lower and more volatile stock prices than when
information is symmetric or there are no ambiguity averse investors. Moreover, partial
revelation leads to skewness and kurtosis in stock returns, which is consistent with stylized
facts for the US. Small changes in information can lead to price swings and ampliﬁcation
due to changes in informational eﬃciency of price. Public information directly aﬀects the
informational eﬃciency of prices and in fact, stock prices can be lower (higher) when good
(bad) public information is observed.
We have focused on a single type of informed investor and a single uncertain asset in
order to highlight the information transmission role of prices. Future areas for research
would allow for multiple types of informed investors who receive diﬀerent information along
the lines sketched out in the supplementary appendix (Section B), thus enabling the study
of information aggregation and transmission as well as the study of multiple traded assets.
In such models, non-revelation of information will require conditions similar to those in (16).
41See Yu (2014) for a brief comparison of the ambiguity aversion approach and an instance of transaction
cost frictions.
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A Appendix: Proofs of results
A.1 Proofs for Section 2
Proof of Lemma 1. In the updating rule developed in Epstein and Schneider (2007), if
a decision maker has a prior and the set of likelihoods is {L(s|·)}L∈L for some index set L,
then the set of updated beliefs about event B is given by
{Pr(B|s)} =
{
Pr(B)L(s|B)∫
L(s|B)dB
∣∣∣∣L ∈ L
}
. (36)
The prior over v has mean μ0 and precision ρ0 and the set of likelihoods is indexed by [−δ, δ].
This updating rule implies that given μ0 and μ ∈ [−δ, δ], v conditional on the signal s is
normally distributed with mean μ|s and precision ρ|s where
μ|s = ρ0μ0 + ρ (s− μ)
ρ0 + ρ
and ρ|s = ρ0 + ρ. (37)
Using these expressions yields the desired result.
Proof of Proposition 1. Using our normalization of pf = 1 and the expressions for the
updated beliefs in (3), the optimal demand for I-investors is the solution to
max
θ
min
μ∈[μI |s,μI |s]
θ(μ− p)− γθ
2
2ρI |s. (38)
The ﬁrst order conditions for I-investors are
0 = μI |s− p− γθ(ρI |s)−1 if θ > 0
0 ∈ [μI |s− p− γθ(ρI |s)−1, μI |s− p− γθ(ρI |s)−1] if θ = 0
0 = μI |s− p− γθ(ρI |s)−1 if θ < 0.
(39)
which yields that
θI(s, p) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
γ(ρI |s)(μI |s− p) if μI |s− p > 0
0 if μI |s− p ≤ 0 and μI |s− p ≥ 0
γ(ρI |s)(μI |s− p) if μI |s− p < 0.
(40)
Using the expressions for μI |s and μI |s in Lemma 1 and simplifying yields the expression in
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(8) for I-investor demand.
Proof of Corollary 1. This follows from using demand expression (8) and the updated
beliefs (3) for I-investors to see that the upper bound of the range of signals for which
I-investors exhibit portfolio inertia in information is
(ρ0 + ρ)
ρ
p− ρ0
ρ
μ0 + δ (41)
and the lower bound is
(ρ0 + ρ)
ρ
p− ρ0
ρ
μ0 − δ (42)
which yields the desired results.
A.2 Proofs for Section 3
Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose markets clear with θI(s) = γ−1ρI |s (μI |s− p) > 0.
Then the market clearing price satisﬁes
p = xI0
(
ρ0μ0 + ρ
ρ0 + ρ
(s− δ)
)
+ (xU0 θ
U − 1) γ
ρ0 + ρ
(43)
where θU denotes U-investor demand. If this price were to be non-revealing then θU must
be a decreasing function of s, which cannot occur, either in partial or full revelation.
In full revelation, s is observed by U-investors and their updated beliefs are that v is
normally distributed with precision ρ0 + ρ and mean
ρ0μ0 + ρs
ρ0 + ρ
. (44)
Then, the optimal demand for U-investors is the solution to
max
θ
θ
(
ρ0μ0 + ρs
ρ0 + ρ
− p
)
− γθ
2
2ρ0 + ρ
(45)
which yields
θU(s) = γ−1(ρ0 + ρ)
(
ρ0μ0 + ρs
ρ0 + ρ
− p
)
, (46)
which is increasing in s.
On the other hand if p(s′) = p(s′′) for s′ > s′′ (without loss of generality), i.e. under par-
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tial revelation, U-investor demand is constant in s, i.e. θU(s′) = θU(s′′) due to measurability
of θU(·) in p(·) (measurability in p(·) reduces to measurability in p(·) with our normalization
of pf = 1).
When the signal s is revealed by the price, given U-investors demand, the market clearing
price satisﬁes
p =
ρ0μ0 + ρs
ρ0 + ρ
− γ
ρ0 + ρ
− xI0
δρ
ρ0 + ρ
(47)
and again this price is consistent with revelation of s to U-investors since it is monotone in
s. Hence with θI(s) > 0, the market clearing price reveals the signal to U-investors. Similar
arguments show that if θI(s) < 0, then price reveals the signal s as well.
Proof of Corollary 2. Suppose the market clears with θI(s) > 0, then the market clearing
price is given by (47) which includes the usual risk premium γ
ρ0+ρ
required by all investors
and an ambiguity premium δρ
ρ0+ρ
required by the xI0 I-investors. A similar argument applies
for θI(s) < 0.
Proof of Proposition 3. For s /∈ [b− 2δ, b], the updated beliefs of U-investors are that v
is normally distributed with precision ρ0 + ρ and mean
ρ0μ0 + ρs
ρ0 + ρ
. (48)
Then, reasoning similar to that for the full revelation case in the proof of Proposition 2 shows
that the optimal demand for U-investors is the solution to
max
θ
θ
(
ρ0μ0 + ρs
ρ0 + ρ
− p
)
− γθ
2
2ρ0 + ρ
(49)
which yields
θU(s) = γ−1(ρ0 + ρ)
(
ρ0μ0 + ρs
ρ0 + ρ
− p
)
. (50)
as desired.
For s ∈ [b−2δ, b], ﬁrst note that U-investors prior beliefs are that s is normally distributed
with mean μ0 and variance ρ
−1
0 + ρ
−1
 . Let f(·) and F (·) denote the density and distribution
functions of s respectively, then conditional on the information that s ∈ [b−2δ, b], U-investors
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beliefs are that s follows a truncated normal distribution with density
fs|[b−2δ,b](s) =
⎧⎨
⎩
f(s)
F (b)−F (b−2δ) , s ∈ [b− 2δ, b]
0, s /∈ [b− 2δ, b]
(51)
.
Let fw,s(·) and Fw,s(·) denote the joint density and joint distribution functions of (w(θ), s)
respectively. Then the density of w(θ) conditional on s ∈ [b− 2δ, b] denoted fw|[b−2δ,b] is
fw|[b−2δ,b](w) =
∫ b
b−2δ fw,s(w, s)ds
F (b)− F (b− 2δ) (52)
.
U-investors choose θ to maximize
UU(θ) = −
∫ ∞
−∞
exp{−γw(θ)}fw|[b−2δ,b](w)dw (53)
Using the fact that for the joint normal density fw,s(w, s) = fw|s(w, s)f(s), rearranging
the order of integrals, and using E[w|s] = θ
(
ρ0μ0+ρs
ρ0+ρ
− p
)
+ p and V[w|s] = θ2
ρ0+ρ
to denote
the mean and variance of w(θ) conditional on s we have
UU(θ) = − 1
F (b)−F (b−2δ)
∫ b
b−2δ
(
exp−γE(w|s)+
1
2
γ2V(w|s)
)
f(s)ds
= − exp
γ2
2 V(w|s)
F (b)−F (b−2δ)
∫ b
b−2δ
(
exp−γE(w|s)
)
f(s)ds
= − exp γ
2
2
θ2 1
ρ0+ρ
+γθ
(
ρμ0
ρ0+ρ
−(μ0−p)
)
−γp ∫ b
b−2δ
(
exp
−γθ ρ
ρ0+ρ
s
)
f(s)
F (b)−F (b−2δ)ds
(54)
Using the moment generating function of a truncated normal (see e.g. Johnson and Kotz
(1970)) yields
= − exp γ
2
2
θ2 1
ρ0+ρ
+γθ
(
ρμ0
ρ0+ρ
−(μ0−p)
)
−γp
exp
− γθρμ0
ρ0+ρ
+ γ
2θ2
2
(
ρ
ρ0+ρ
)2( ρ+ρ0
ρ0ρ
)
×[
Φ
(
(b−μ0)
√
ρ0ρ
ρ+ρ0
+
√
ρ+ρ0
ρ0ρ
γθρ
ρ0+ρ
)
−Φ
(
(b−2δ−μ0)
√
ρ0ρ
ρ+ρ0
+
√
ρ+ρ0
ρ0ρ
γθρ
ρ0+ρ
)
Φ
(
(b−μ0)
√
ρ0ρ
ρ+ρ0
)
−Φ
(
(b−2δ−μ0)
√
ρ0ρ
ρ+ρ0
)
]
= − exp γ
2θ2
2
1
ρ0
−γθ(μ0−p)−γp×[
Φ
(
(b−μ0)
√
ρ0ρ
ρ+ρ0
+
√
ρ+ρ0
ρ0ρ
γθρ
ρ0+ρ
)
−Φ
(
(b−2δ−μ0)
√
ρ0ρ
ρ+ρ0
+
√
ρ+ρ0
ρ0ρ
γθρ
ρ0+ρ
)
Φ
(
(b−μ0)
√
ρ0ρ
ρ+ρ0
)
−Φ
(
(b−2δ−μ0)
√
ρ0ρ
ρ+ρ0
)
]
(55)
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The ﬁrst order condition for (53) with respect to θ yields
0 =
(
γθ 1
ρ0
− (μ0 − p)
)
×[
Φ
(
(b− μ0)
√
ρ0ρ
ρ+ρ0
+
√
ρ+ρ0
ρ0ρ
γθρ
ρ0+ρ
)
− Φ
(
(b− 2δ − μ0)
√
ρ0ρ
ρ+ρ0
+
√
ρ+ρ0
ρ0ρ
γθρ
ρ0+ρ
)]
+√
ρ0+ρ
ρ0ρ
ρ
ρ0+ρ
[
φ
(
(b− μ0)
√
ρ0ρ
ρ+ρ0
+
√
ρ+ρ0
ρ0ρ
γθρ
ρ0+ρ
)
− φ
(
(b− 2δ − μ0)
√
ρ0ρ
ρ+ρ0
+
√
ρ+ρ0
ρ0ρ
γθρ
ρ0+ρ
)]
(56)
which yields the following implicit expression for U-investor demand,
θ = γ−1
(
ρ0(μ0 − p) + ρ0ρρ0+ρΔ1(b− 2δ +
γθ
ρ0
, b+ γθ
ρ0
)
)
(57)
where
Δ(b−2δ+γθ
ρ0
, b+
γθ
ρ0
) =
√
ρ0 + ρ
ρ0ρ
⎡
⎢⎣ φ(
√
ρ0ρ
ρ0+ρ
(
b− 2δ − μ0 + γθρ0
)
)− φ(
√
ρ0ρ
ρ0+ρ
(
b− μ0 + γθρ0
)
)
Φ(
√
ρ0ρ
ρ0+ρ
(
b− μ0 + γθρ0
)
)− Φ(
√
ρ0ρ
ρ0+ρ
(
b− 2δ − μ0 + γθρ0
)
)
⎤
⎥⎦
(58)
Proof of Proposition 4. Market clearing with θI = 0 requires xU0 θ
U = 1. For s /∈ [b−2δ, b]
and s ∈ [b − 2δ, b], using θU = (xU0 )−1 and the expression for U-investor demand in (12) in
Proposition 3 provides the desired expression for pPR(s) in (14). Non-linearity of pPR follows
from the fact that the function is strictly increasing in s for s /∈ [b− 2δ, b] and constant for
s ∈ [b− 2δ, b]. Discontinuity at b follows from
lim
s↓b
pPR(s)− lim
s↑b
pPR(s) =
ρ
ρ0 + ρ
(
b+
γ
xU0 ρ0
− μ0 −Δ
(
b+
γ
xU0 ρ0
− 2δ, b+ γ
xU0 ρ0
))
> 0
(59)
where the strict inequality follows from the fact that by the properties of a truncated normal
distribution (see eg. Johnson and Kotz (1970))
E
[
s
∣∣∣∣s ∈
[
b+
γ
xU0 ρ0
− 2δ, b+ γ
xU0 ρ0
]]
≡ μ0 +Δ
(
b+
γ
xU0 ρ0
− 2δ, b+ γ
xU0 ρ0
)
. (60)
A similar inequality implies discontinuity at b − 2δ. Trade volume is xI0 since θI(s) = 0 for
all s.
The next lemma collects several facts that are useful in proving subsequent results.
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Lemma 3. Signal s is normally distributed with mean μ0 and variance σ
2
s ≡ ρ−10 + ρ−1 . Let
f(·) denote the density function of s. Then for scalars B1, B2,
1.
∂
∂B2
∫ B2
B2−B1
sf(s)ds = B2f(B2)− (B2 − B1)f(B2 − B1)
2.
∂
∂B2
∫ B2
B2−B1
f(s)ds = f(B2)− f(B2 − B1)
3. f(B2 − B1) = f(B2)e−
B1(
B1
2 +μ0)
σ2s e
B1B2
σ2s
4. B2f(B2)− (B2 − B1)f(B2 − B1) =
∫ B2
B2−B1
f(s)ds−
∫ B2
B2−B1
s
(
s− μ0
σ2s
)
f(s)ds
5. f(B2 − B1)− f(B2) = 1
σ2s
∫ B2
B2−B1
sf(s)ds− μ0
σ2s
∫ B2
B2−B1
f(s)ds
6. 0 <
∂
∂B2
E[s|B2 − B1 ≤ s ≤ B2] < 1 for all −∞ < B2 < ∞
(61)
Proof. The ﬁrst two results follow from Leibniz’s rule and the third by rearranging terms
in f(B2 − B1). The fourth follows from integrating
∫ B2
B2−B1 f(s)ds by parts where u = f(s)
and dv = ds. The ﬁfth follows from observing that
f ′(s) = −
(
s− μ0
σ2s
)
f(s) (62)
and integrating both sides of equation (62) over the region [B2 − B1, B1].
To show
0 <
∂
∂B2
E[s|B2 − B1 ≤ s ≤ B2] < 1 (63)
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calculate
∂E[s|B2 − B1 ≤ s ≤ B2]
∂B2
=
∂
∂B2
∫ B2
B2−B1 sf(s)ds∫ B2
B2−B1 f(s)ds
=
(∫ B2
B2−B1 f(s)ds
)
(B2f(B2)− (B2 − B1)f(B2 − B1))−
(∫ B2
B2−B1 sf(s)ds
)
(f(B2)− f(B2 − B1))(∫ B2
B2−B1 f(s)ds
)2
=
(∫ B2
B2−B1 f(s)ds
)
(B2f(B2)− (B2 − B1)f(B2 − B1))(∫ B2
B2−B1 f(s)ds
)2
+
(∫ B2
B2−B1 sf(s)ds
)(
1
σ2s
∫ B2
B2−B1 sf(s)ds−
μ0
σ2s
∫
B2−B1 B2f(s)ds
)
(∫ B2
B2−B1 f(s)ds
)2
=
(∫ B2
B2−B1 f(s)ds
)(∫ B2
B2−B1 f(s)ds−
∫ B2
B2−B1 s
(
s−μ0
σ2s
)
f(s)ds
)
(∫ B2
B2−B1 f(s)ds
)2
+
(∫ B2
B2−B1 sf(s)ds
)(
1
σ2s
∫ B2
B2−B1 sf(s)ds−
μ0
σ2s
∫ B2
B2−B1 f(s)ds
)
(∫ B2
B2−B1 f(s)ds
)2
=1− 1
σ2s
∫ B2
B2−B1 s
2f(s)ds∫ B2
B2−B1 f(s)ds
+
μ0
σ2s
∫ B2
B2−B1 sf(s)ds∫ B2
B2−B1 f(s)ds
− 1
σ2s
[∫ B2
B2−B1 sf(s)ds∫ B2
B2−B1 f(s)ds
]2
− μ0
σ2s
∫ B2
B2−B1 sf(s)ds∫ B2
B2−B1 f(s)ds
=1− 1
σ2s
E[s2|B2 − B1 ≤ s ≤ B2] + 1
σ2s
E[s|B2 − B1 ≤ s ≤ B2]2
=1− 1
σ2s
V(s|B2 − B1 ≤ s ≤ B2)
(64)
The third and fourth equalities follow from facts 5 and 4, respectively and the rest are
simpliﬁcations. The result follows since
0 < V(s|B2 − B1 ≤ s ≤ B) < σ2s ≡ V(s). (65)
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Proof of Proposition 5. We characterize the existence of a solution to (16). We ﬁrst
prove that if a solution b exists then γ
xU0 ρ
< δ. First, for any b, by the properties of a
truncated normal distribution (see eg. Johnson and Kotz (1970)) note that
E
[
s
∣∣∣∣s ∈
[
b+
γ
xU0 ρ0
− 2δ, b+ γ
xU0 ρ0
]]
≡ μ0 +Δ
(
b+
γ
xU0 ρ0
− 2δ, b+ γ
xU0 ρ0
)
(66)
Deﬁne h(·) as
h(b) = b+
γ
xU0 ρ0
− μ0 −Δ
(
b+
γ
xU0 ρ0
− 2δ, b+ γ
xU0 ρ0
)
(67)
and rewrite equation (16) as
h(b) = δ − γ
xU0 ρ
. (68)
If γ
xU0 ρ
> δ then (16) requires h(b) < 0 ⇔ b + γ
xU0 ρ0
< E
[
s
∣∣∣b+ γxU0 ρ0 − 2δ ≤ s ≤ b+ γxU0 ρ0
]
,
which is a contradiction.
We prove suﬃciency by showing that h(·) takes all values in [0, δ] as b → −∞. When
γ = 0, ie. γ
xU0 ρ
= 0, b0 = μ0 +
γ
xU0 ρ0
+ δ = μ0 + δ solves (16), ie. h(b0) = δ, since
Δ(μ0 − δ, μ0 + δ) = 0 given the symmetry of a normal density function around its mean.
For any −∞ < b < ∞, h′(b) exists and from (63) 0 < h′(b) < 1 with B2 = b + γxU0 ρ0 and
B1 = 2δ. Moreover, for γ ∈ [0, δxU0 ρ],
lim
b→−∞
b+
γ
xU0 ρ0
≤ lim
b→−∞
b+
δρ
ρ0
= −∞. (69)
Hence, it suﬃces to show that
lim
b→−∞
h(b) = 0. (70)
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Using L’Hopital’s rule, 1-3 in Lemma 3 and rearranging terms,
lim
b→−∞
E
[
s
∣∣∣∣s ∈
[
b+
γ
xU0 ρ0
− 2δ, b+ γ
xU0 ρ0
]]
= lim
b→−∞
∫ b+ γxU0 ρ0
b+ γ
xU0 ρ0
−2δ sf(s)ds
∫ b+ γxU0 ρ0
b+ γ
xU0 ρ0
−2δ f(s)ds
= lim
b→−∞
∂
∂b
∫ b+ γxU0 ρ0
b+ γ
xU0 ρ0
−2δ sf(s)ds
∂
∂b
∫ b+ γxU0 ρ0
b+ γ
xU0 ρ0
−2δ f(s)ds
= lim
b→−∞
(
b+ γ
xU0 ρ0
)
f
(
b+ γ
xU0 ρ0
)
−
(
b+ γ
xU0 ρ0
− 2δ
)
f
(
b+ γ
xU0 ρ0
− 2δ
)
f
(
b+ γ
xU0 ρ0
)
− f
(
b+ γ
xU0 ρ0
− 2δ
)
= lim
b→−∞
(
b+ γ
xU0 ρ0
)(
f
(
b+ γ
xU0 ρ0
)
− f
(
b+ γ
xU0 ρ0
− 2δ
))
+ 2δf
(
b+ γ
xU0 ρ0
− 2δ
)
f
(
b+ γ
xU0 ρ0
)
− f
(
b+ γ
xU0 ρ0
− 2δ
)
= lim
b→−∞
b+
γ
xU0 ρ0
+ 2δ
f
(
b+ γ
xU0 ρ0
− 2δ
)
f
(
b+ γ
xU0 ρ0
)
− f
(
b+ γ
xU0 ρ0
− 2δ
)
= lim
b→−∞
b+
γ
xU0 ρ0
+ 2δ
f
(
b+ γ
xU0 ρ0
)
e
− 2δ(δ+μ0)
σ2s e
2δ
(
b+
γ
xU0 ρ0
)
σ2s
f
(
b+ γ
xU0 ρ0
)⎛⎜⎝1− e− 2δ(δ+μ0)σ2s e
2δ
(
b+
γ
xU0 ρ0
)
σ2s
⎞
⎟⎠
= lim
b→−∞
b+
γ
xU0 ρ0
+ 2δ
e−
2δ(δ+μ0)
σ2 e
2δ
(
b+
γ
xU0 ρ0
)
σ2s
1− e−
2δ(δ+μ0)
σ2s e
2δ
(
b+
γ
xU0 ρ0
)
σ2s
,
(71)
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which yields
lim
b→−∞
h(b) = lim
b→−∞
b+
γ
xU0 ρ0
− E
[
s
∣∣∣∣s ∈
[
b+
γ
xU0 ρ0
− 2δ, b+ γ
xU0 ρ0
]]
= lim
b→−∞
b+
γ
xU0 ρ0
− b− γ
xU0 ρ0
− 2δ e
− 2δ(δ+μ0)
σ2 e
2δ
(
b+
γ
xU0 ρ0
)
σ2
1− e− 2δ(δ+μ0)σ2 e
2δ
(
b+
γ
xU0 ρ0
)
σ2
= lim
b→−∞
−2δ e
− 2δ(δ+μ0)
σ2 e
2δ
(
b+
γ
xU0 ρ0
)
σ2
1− e− 2δ(δ+μ0)σ2 e
2δ
(
b+
γ
xU0 ρ0
)
σ2
= 0.
(72)
Hence, a solution to (16) exists if and only if γ ∈ [0, xU0 ρδ]. A consequence of the above is
also that −Δ
(
b+ γ
xU0 ρ0
− 2δ, b+ γ
xU0 ρ0
)
> 0 if γ > 0. The existence of a solution to (16) if
and only if γ ∈ [0, xU0 ρδ] characterizes the existence of an interval [b − 2δ, b] of unrevealed
signals. Finally, uniqueness of b follows from the fact that h′(b) > 0.
Market clearing with θI(s) = 0 requires that the market clearing price p(s) ∈ [μI |s, μI |s]
given the I-investors demand expression (8). For s /∈ [b − 2δ, b], using the expression for
market clearing price pPR(s) in (14) and those for μ
I |s and μI |s from (3) shows that pPR(s) ∈
[μI |s, μI |s] if and only if γ ∈ [0, xU0 ρδ]. For s ∈ [b− 2δ, b], since
b = μ0 +Δ
(
b+
γ
xU0 ρ0
− 2δ, b+ γ
xU0 ρ0
)
− γ
xU0
(
1
ρ0
+
1
ρ
)
+ δ (73)
it follows that pPR(s) ∈ [μI |s, μI |s]. On other hand if γ > xU0 ρδ, there exists s ∈ [b− 2δ, b]
such that pPR(s) < μ
I |s which contradicts market clearing with θI(s) = 0. Hence, markets
clear with θI(s) = 0 for all s if and only if γ ∈ [0, xU0 ρδ].
A.3 Proofs for section 4
Proof of Proposition 6. Suppose δ = 0. Then, the updated belief of I investors about v
is given by the normal distribution with mean ρ0μ0+ρs
ρ0+ρ
and precision ρ0 + ρ. The optimal
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portfolio θINA(s, p) of I investors is then given by
θINA(s, p) = γ
−1(ρ0 + ρ)
(
ρ0μ0 + ρs
ρ0 + ρ
− p
)
. (74)
Clearly θI(s, p) = 0 if and only if s = μ0. So, reasoning similarly to the proof of Proposition
2 (or to for example, the analysis in Grossman (1976)) shows that market clearing price will
always reveal s to U investors. So, the U investors optimal portfolio given their updated
beliefs about v is given by
θUNA(s, p) = γ
−1(ρ0 + ρ)
(
ρ0μ0 + ρs
ρ0 + ρ
− p
)
(75)
and the unique market clearing price for each s is given by pNA(s) as in (18). This price
function is clearly fully revealing, which provides the desired result.
Proof of Proposition 7. The proof to Proposition 5 establishes that b = μ0 + δ solves
(16) when γ = 0 and that in this case Δ (b− 2δ, b) = 0 due to the symmetry of the normal
pdf around μ0. To show that the premium is positive and increasing in γ whenever γ > 0,
we show that
d
dγ
Δ
(
b+
γ
xU0 ρ0
− 2δ, b+ γ
xU0 ρ0
)
< 0 (76)
Using the sixth result in Lemma 3 with B2 = b+
γ
xU0 ρ0
and B1 = 2δ and (66) yields for any b
0 <
∂
∂b
Δ
(
b+
γ
xU0 ρ0
− 2δ, b+ γ
xU0 ρ0
)
< 1 (77)
and any γ,
0 <
∂
∂γ
Δ
(
b+
γ
xU0 ρ0
− 2δ, b+ γ
xU0 ρ0
)
<
1
xU0 ρ0
(78)
Applying the implicit function theorem to equation (16) then yields
d
dγ
Δ
(
b+ γ
xU0 ρ0
− 2δ, b+ γ
xU0 ρ0
)
= −
1
xU0 ρ0
+ 1
xU0 ρ
− ∂
∂γ
Δ
(
b+ γ
xU0 ρ0
−2δ,b+ γ
xU0 ρ0
)
((
∂
∂b
Δ
(
b+ γ
xU0 ρ0
−2δ,b+ γ
xU0 ρ0
))−1
−1
) < 0 (79)
We show that E[s|s ∈ [b − 2δ, b]] − E[s|s ∈ [b + γ
xU0 ρ0
− 2δ, b + γ
xU0 ρ0
]] + γ
xU0 ρ0
> 0, which
establishes the desired result given (66) . The following notation will be useful to show this
fact: for any γ ∈ (0, δxU0 ρ), let b(γ) denote the solution to the existence equation (83). Let
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γ ∈ (0, δxU0 ρ). It follows that
E[s|s ∈ [b(γ) + γ
xU0 ρ0
− 2δ, b(γ) + γ
xU0 ρˆ0
]]− E[s|s ∈ [b(γ)− 2δ, b(γ)]]
=
∫ γxU0 ρ0
0
∂
∂k
E[s|s ∈ [b(γ) + k − 2δ, b(γ) + k]]dk
<
∫ γxU0 ρ0
0 dk
= γ
xU0 ρ0
,
(80)
where the ﬁrst equality is due to the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus and we use Lemma
3.6 to obtain the strict inequality. This yields the desired result.
Finally, for any b, E [s |b− 2δ ≤ s ≤ b ] < E
[
s
∣∣∣b+ γxU0 ρ0 − 2δ ≤ s ≤ b+ γxU0 ρ0
]
if γ > 0,
which establishes that E [s |b− 2δ ≤ s ≤ b ] < μ0 given (66) since Δ
(
b+ γ
xU0 ρ0
− 2δ, b+ γ
xU0 ρ0
)
<
0 when γ > 0.
Proof of Proposition 8. We show that E[v − pPR] > E[v − pFR]. Using (14) and (17),
and f(·) and F (·) to denote the pdf and cdf respectively of s, we get
E[v − pPR]− E[v − pFR]
=
∫ b
b−2δ
(
s− μ0 −Δ
(
b+ γ
xU0 ρ0
− 2δ, b+ γ
xU0 ρ0
)
+ γ
xU0 ρ0
)
f(s)ds
= [F (b)− F (b− 2δ)]
(
E[s|s ∈ [b− 2δ, b]]− E[s|s ∈ [b+ γ
xU0 ρ0
− 2δ, b+ γ
xU0 ρ0
]] + γ
xU0 ρ0
)
.
(81)
It follows from the proof of Proposition 7 that E[s|s ∈ [b − 2δ, b]] − E[s|s ∈ [b + γ
xU0 ρ0
−
2δ, b+ γ
xU0 ρ0
]] + γ
xU0 ρ0
> 0. This yields the desired result.
Finally, using the fact that pNA(s) > pFR(s) for all s yields E[v − pPR] > E[v − pFR] >
E[v − pNA] as desired.
A.4 Proofs for Section 5
Proof of Lemma 2. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 1.
Proof of Proposition 9 . Proceeding along the same lines as in section 3 shows that U-
investor demand is given by
θU(s) =
⎧⎨
⎩γ
−1(ρˆ0 + ρ)(μˆ0(ζ) +
ρ
ρˆ0+ρ
(s− μˆ0(ζ))− p) if s /∈ [bζ − 2δ, bζ ]
γ−1ρˆ0
(
μˆ0(ζ) +
ρ
ρˆ0+ρ
Δ
(
bζ − 2δ + γθU (s)ρˆ0 , bζ +
γθU (s)
ρˆ0
)
− p
)
if s ∈ [bζ − 2δ, bζ ],
(82)
45
the length of the interval of unrevealed signals is 2δ, and the existence of the interval follows
from the existence of a solution to (24). The proof then follows reasoning similar to that for
Proposition 5.
Proof of Proposition 10. We ﬁrst show that d
dζ
bζ =
ρζ
ρˆ0
> 0 for any ζ. For any ζ, the
equilibrium existence condition is
bζ +
γ
xU0 ρˆ0
− μˆ0(ζ)−Δζ
(
bζ +
γ
xU0 ρˆ0
− 2δ, bζ + γ
xU0 ρˆ0
)
= δ − γ
xU0 ρ
. (83)
From this it follows that d
dζ
bζ =
d
dμˆ0
bζ
d
dζ
μˆ0(ζ).
Let f(·|ζ) denote the distribution of the private signal given public signal ζ. Note that
∂
∂μˆ0(ζ)
f(s|ζ) = f(s|ζ)
(
s− μˆ0(ζ)
σ2s
)
(84)
where σ2s = ρˆ
−1
0 + ρ
−1
 .
Moreover, μˆ0(ζ) + Δζ
(
bζ +
γ
xU0 ρˆ0
− 2δ, bζ + γxU0 ρˆ0
)
is diﬀerentiable in μˆ0(ζ) with
∂
∂μˆ0(ζ)
(
μˆ0(ζ) + Δζ
(
bζ +
γ
xU0 ρˆ0
− 2δ, bζ + γxU0 ρˆ0
))
=
⎛
⎝∫ bζ+
γ
xU0 ρˆ0
bζ+
γ
xU0 ρˆ0
−2δ f(s|ζ)ds
⎞
⎠
⎛
⎜⎝ ∂∂μˆ0(ζ) ∫
bζ+
γ
xU0 ρˆ0
b
ζ+
γ
xU0 ρˆ0
−2δ
sf(s|ζ)ds
⎞
⎟⎠−
⎛
⎜⎝∫ bζ+
γ
xU0 ρˆ0
b
ζ+
γ
xU0 ρˆ0
−2δ
sf(s|ζ)ds
⎞
⎟⎠
⎛
⎜⎝ ∂∂μˆ0(ζ) ∫
bζ+
γ
xU0 ρˆ0
b
ζ+
γ
xU0 ρˆ0
−2δ
f(s|ζ)ds
⎞
⎟⎠
⎛
⎜⎝∫ bζ+
γ
xU0 ρˆ0
b
ζ+
γ
xU0 ρˆ0
−2δ
f(s|ζ)ds
⎞
⎟⎠
2
=
V
[
s
∣∣∣∣bζ+ γxU0 ρˆ0−2δ,bζ+ γxU0 ρˆ0 ,ζ
]
σ2sζ
> 0 for bζ > −∞
(85)
where the last equality follows by using (84) and combining terms.
Using the implicit function theorem for (83) with (85) and the expression in the last line
of (64) in the proof of Lemma 3.6, it follows that
d
dμˆ0(ζ)
bζ = −
− ∂
∂μˆ0
E[s|s ∈ [bζ + γxU0 ρˆ0 − 2δ, bζ +
γ
xU0 ρˆ0
], ζ]
1− ∂
∂b
E[s|s ∈ [bζ + γxU0 ρˆ0 − 2δ, bζ +
γ
xU0 ρˆ0
], ζ]
= 1. (86)
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Since d
dζ
μˆ0(ζ) =
ρζ
ρˆ0
> 0, using the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus, we have
bζ¯ − bμ0 =
∫ ζ¯
μ0
d
dζ
bζdζ =
ρζ
ρˆ0
(ζ¯ − μ0) > 0 (87)
as desired.
Using μˆ0(ζ) =
ρμ0+ρζζ
ρˆ0
and using (83) to express ψ(s, ζ) (from (26)) in terms of bζ−δ+ γxU0 ρ
for ζ ∈ {ζ¯ , μ0}, we have that for any s ∈ [bμ0 , bζ¯ ],
pPR(s, ζ¯)− pPR(s, μ0) = ρζ
ρˆ0 + ρ
(ζ¯ − μ0) + ρ
ρˆ0 + ρ
(
bζ + δ − γ
xU0 ρ
− s
)
. (88)
and for any s ∈ [bμ0 − 2δ, bζ¯ − 2δ],
pPR(s, ζ¯)− pPR(s, μ0) = ρζ
ρˆ0 + ρ
(ζ¯ − μ0) + ρ
ρˆ0 + ρ
(
s− bμ0 − δ +
γ
xU0 ρ
)
. (89)
Substituting s = bμ0 in the RHS of (88), which is decreasing in s, shows that pPR(s, ζ¯) −
pPR(s, μ0) < 0 and substituting s = bζ − 2δ in the RHS of (89), which is increasing in s,
shows that pPR(s, ζ¯)− pPR(s, μ0) < 0 under (29).
On the other hand, for any s ∈ [bμ0 , bζ¯ ] ∪ [bμ0 − 2δ, bζ¯ − 2δ],
pFR(s, ζ¯)− pFR(s, μ0) = ρζ
ρ
(ζ¯ − μ0) > 0 (90)
A.5 Proofs for Section 6.
Proof of Proposition 11. If γ > xU0 δρ the price function
pFR(s) =
ρ0μ0 + ρs
ρ0 + ρ
− γ
ρ0 + ρ
− xI0
δρ
ρ0 + ρ
(91)
is a fully-revealing REE price function and if 0 ≤ γ ≤ xU0 δρ then
pFR(s) =
ρ0μ0 + ρs
ρ0 + ρ
− γ
xU0 (ρ0 + ρ)
. (92)
is a fully revealing REE price function.
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Proof of Proposition 12. Suppose the I traders’ have a symmetric linear strategy θˆINA(s, p) =
AI +BIs−CIp. Since I traders do not make any inference from price, the optimal portfolio
for each I trader is E[v|s]−p
γV[v|s] =
ρ0+ρ
γ
[
ρ0μ0+ρs
ρ0+ρ
− p
]
. Comparing this to the linear strategy
yields AI =
ρ0μ0
γ
, BI =
ρ
γ
, CI =
ρ0+ρ
γ
.
Given the linear strategy of I traders, the market clearing condition yields p =
xI0AI−1
xI0CI
+
BI
CI
s+
xU0
xI0CI
θˆU(p), where θˆU(p) denotes the symmetric strategy of U traders. Given the linear
form of p in the market clearing condition, the best reponse of U traders is a linear strategy
θˆU(p) = AU − CUp.
Since U traders make inference from price, the optimal portfolio of the U investor is
E[v|p]−p
γV[v|p] . Using the linear strategies of I and U traders, the market clearing condition yields
s =
xI0CI+x
U
0 CU
xI0BI
p− xI0AI+xU0 AU−1
xI0BI
, hence conditioning on the market clearing price is equivalent
to conditioning on the signal. In particular, V[v|s] = (ρ0 + ρ)−1 and E[v|p] = ρ0μ0ρ0+ρ +
ρ
ρ0+ρ
(
xI0CI+x
U
0 CU
xI0BI
p− xI0AI+xU0 AU−1
xI0BI
)
Using the above and the expressions for AI , BI , CI yields AU = 1 and CU = 0 as required.
Proof of Proposition 13. Suppose the I traders’ have the symmetric strategy
θˆI(s, p) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
AI + BIs− CIp if AICI +
BI
CI
s > p
0 if
A¯I + BIs− CIp if A¯ICI +
BI
CI
s < p
(93)
where A¯I > AI .
The optimal portfolio for each I trader is
θI(s, p) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
γ−1(ρ0 + ρ) (ρ0μ0 + ρ(s− δ)− p) if ρ0μ0 + ρ(s− δ) > p
0 if ρ0μ0 + ρ(s− δ) ≤ p ≤ ρ0μ0 + ρ(s+ δ)
γ−1(ρ0 + ρ) (ρ0μ0 + ρ(s+ δ)− p) if ρ0μ0 + ρ(s+ δ) < p.
(94)
. Comparing this to the strategy in (93) yields AI =
ρ0μ0−δρ
γ
, A¯I = A¯I =
ρ0μ0+δρ
γ
, BI =
ρ
γ
, CI =
ρ0+ρ
γ
. Note that this demand schedule is sensitive to s since ρ0μ0 + ρ(s + δ) and
ρ0μ0 + ρ(s− δ) are monotone and linear in s.
Suppose U traders have a symmetric strategy θˆU(p). In this case, the market clearing
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condition yields
p =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
xI0AI−1
xI0CI
− BI
CI
s− xU0 θˆU(p) if AICI +
BI
CI
s > p(
θˆU
)−1 (
1
xU0
)
if
AI
CI
+ BI
CI
s ≤ p ≤ A¯I
CI
+ BI
CI
s
xI0A¯I−1
xI0CI
− BI
CI
s− xU0 θˆU(p) if A¯ICI +
BI
CI
s < p.
(95)
If
AI
CI
+ BI
CI
s > p or A¯I
CI
+ BI
CI
s < p, then the linearity of p in s in (95) implies that the
optimal portfolio of each the U investor is E[v|p]−p
γV[v|p] since U traders make inference from the
price. Reasoning similarly to the proof of Proposition 12 shows that p reveals s and market
clearing would require p = ρ0μ0+ρs
ρ0+ρ
− γ+xI0δρ
ρ0+ρ
. However, if γ ≤ xI0δρ, then at this price
AI
CI
+ BI
CI
s ≤ p or A¯I
CI
+ BI
CI
s ≥ p, which rules out an equilibrium with θˆI(s, p) = 0 for any s.
There are two price functions which lead to market clearing with θI(s, p) = 0 and satisfy
the requirement that A¯I
CI
+ BI
CI
s ≤ p ≤ AI
CI
+ BI
CI
s. These are the linear fully revealing price
function (17) and the non-linear and discontinuous partially revealing price function (14).
With the linear price function (17), U traders’ optimal portfolio is E[v|p]−p
γV[v|p] since U traders
make inference from the price. Given this price function and the optimal portfolio of U
traders, the strategy θˆU(p) = 1
xU0
is U traders’ best response as required.
With the non-linear price function (14), U traders’ optimal portfolio is
⎧⎨
⎩
E[v|p]−p
γV[v|p] if p = p¯
γ−1ρ0
(
μ0 +
ρ
ρ0+ρ
Δ
(
b− 2δ + γθU
ρ0
, b+ γθ
U
ρ0
)
− p
)
if p = p¯
(96)
where p¯ = μ0 +
ρ
ρ0+ρ
(
Δ
(
b+ γ
xU0 ρ0
− 2δ, b+ γ
xU0 ρ0
)
− γ
xU0 ρ0
)
− γ
xU0
1
ρ0+ρ
.
Given the price function and the optimal porfolio of U traders, the strategy θˆ(p) = 1
xU0
is
U traders’ best response.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium price function
The parameter values for all plots in the paper are ρ0 = 0.1, ρ = 0.1, μ0 = 100 and δ = 5. For
each market risk scenario, xU0 = 0.99. Low, medium, and high market risk correspond to γ = 0
(risk-neutral), γ = 0.1 and γ = 0.2 respectively.
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Figure 2: Relative volatility of prices with σ2pPR,η = Var(pPR|b − η < s < b + η), σ2pFR,η =
Var(pFR|b− η < s < b+ η) for small η > 0. Parameter values are as in Figure 1(b).
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Figure 3: The equity premium as a function of δ and γ.
All ﬁgures in this section have the following parameter values: xU0 = 0.95, μ0 = 100, ρ0 = ρ = 1/10.
Plots with varying γ have δ = 4 and plots with varying δ have γ = 0.11.
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Figure 4: Return variance as a function of δ and γ.
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Figure 5: Return skewness as a function of δ and γ
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Figure 6: Return kurtosis as a function of δ and γ.
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Figure 7: Eﬀect of a public signal ζ that conﬁrms the mean (ζ = μ0). Parameters are the same as
those of Figure 1(b) with γ = 0.1. The public signal has precision ρζ = 0.1.
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